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CASE NOTES
Antitrust-Bar-Association Minimum Fee Schedules Held Exempt from

the Sherman Act.-The plaintiff brought an antitrust class action under the
Sherman Act' seeking treble damages 2 and injunctive relief,3 alleging that the
maintenance of minimum fee schedules by the Virginia State Bar (State Bar)
and the Fairfax County Bar Association (Fairfax Bar) had artificially inflated
the cost of legal services to title examinations. The district court held for the
4
plaintiff against Fairfax Bar, enjoining the use of its minimum fee schedule,
but refused to find liability on the part of the State Bar, asserting that its limited
involvement in the minimum fee structure was within the bounds of its state
authorized power to regulate the legal profession, and that it was, therefore,
exempt from liability under the Sherman Act. The court of appeals upheld the
lower court's ruling which exonerated the State Bar, but reversed as to Fairfax
Bar, holding the latter exempt from the Sherman Act under two theories: first,
that it was within the "learned profession" exemption; and second, that the
practice of law did not involve interstate commerce. Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3087 (U.S.
Aug. 13, 1974) (No. 74-70).
Minimum fee schedules have been held to be a form of horizontal price-fixing,
itself an unreasonable restraint of trade per se.7 Thus, once a determination has
1. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) provides in part:
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal ..

."

2. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) provides in part:
"Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything for.
bidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor . . . and shall recover threefold the damages
by him sustained .... "
3. Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970) provides for "injunctive relief ...
against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws . .. .
4. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 355 F. Supp. 491 (E-D. Va. 1973), aff'd in part & rev'd
in part, 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3087 (U.S. Aug. 13, 1974)
(No. 74-70). The request for damages was severed from the issue of liability. Id. at 496.
The lower court decision is analyzed in Comment, Minimum Fee Schedules: An Antitrust
Problem, 48 Tul. L. Rev. 628 (1974).
5. 355 F. Supp. at 496.
6. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 489 (1950).
7. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram &Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951); United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221-23 (1940); United States v. Trenton
Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927). In a per se situation, the rule of reason discussed
in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) does not apply. See
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 8 (1958). The fact that there is no penalty
for violation of fee schedules is irrelevant. See United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate
Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 489 (1950); Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 26, 44 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1077 (1972).
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been made that the minimum fee schedules of the various bar associations constitute a per se restraint of trade, the legal profession is in violation of the
Sherman Act unless exempt. Such exemption arguably can exist under the following theories: first, that the practice of law is a purely local activity, not involved in interstate commerce;" second, that the promulgation and maintenance
of such schedules constitute a legitimate restraint on trade imposed by the
state; 9 or third, that the legal profession is neither trade nor commerce, but
rather a "earned profession."'1 If any of these theories apply, the minimum fee
schedules are outside the purview of the Sherman Act.
The first of these, the intrastate commerce exemption, is based on the fact
that the Sherman Act applies only to interstate restraints of trade or commerce."
Judicial construction of the commerce clause compels an expansive view of federal jurisdiction under the Sherman Act.
We have been shown not one piece of reliable evidence that the Congress of 1890
intended to freeze the proscription of the Sherman Act within the mold of then
current judicial decisions defining the commerce power. On the contrary, all the
acceptable evidence points the other way.12

Two distinct categories of activity have been held to involve interstate commerce: those directly in the flow of interstate commerce;' 3 and those which are
intrastate in nature but which nevertheless substantially affect interstate commerce. 14 The second test has caused the courts difficulty, the elusive question
being whether a given situation has a substantial effect. The test of substantiality
is not onerous.' 5 Further, it is enough that a particular course of conduct merely
threatens to affect commerce in a substantial manner.' 6 With regard to the Sher8. See note 11 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 20-21 infra and accompanying text.
10. See notes 38-39 infra and accompanying text.
11. See generally United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 293 (1945).
12. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 557-58 (1944) (insurance held to affect commerce "among the states").
13. Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 321 (1967) (per curiam). See also Mandeville Island
Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 227-35 (1948); Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341, 343 (9th Cir. 1969) ; Las Vegas Merchant
Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732, 739 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 US. 817
(1954).
14. See sources cited in note 13 supra.
15. "The effect on interstate commerce need not have been gargantuan nor precisely
mathematicized. It is sufficient if it is more than merely inconsequential." Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1303 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 US. 1047 (1972). See generally Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal
Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 234 (1948) ; United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U .S. 150,
224-25 n.59 (1940); Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732,
739-40 n.3 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954).
16. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 US. 219, 234
(1948).
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man Act, a restraint may relate only to the local aspect of the total process and
still be subject to its provisions.
Restraints, to be effective, do not have to be applied all along the line of movement
of interstate commerce. The source of the restraint may be intrastate, as the making
of a contract or combination usually is; the application of the restraint may be intrastate, as it often is; but neither matters if the necessary effect is to stifle or restrain
commerce among the states. If it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does
not matter how local the operation which applies the squeeze. 17
Of course, federal power over commerce does not extend to activities so exclusively local that the relationship to any aspect of interstate commerce is clearly
tangential.' 8 However, it is difficult to predict exactly where this line will be
drawn.' 9
A combination in restraint of trade, which involves interstate commerce, does
not necessarily violate the Sherman Act. In Parker v. Brown,20 the Supreme
Court ruled that the Sherman Act did not govern actions undertaken by state
officials at the direction of the state's legislature.21 At issue in Parker was an act
authorizing programs to restrict competition and maintain prices of agricultural
products in order "to 'conserve the agricultural wealth of the State' and to 'prevent economic waste in the marketing of agricultural products' "22 grown within
17. United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949).
18. Rosemound Sand & Gravel Co. v. Lambert Sand & Gravel Co., 469 F.2d 416 (5th
Cir. 1972) (dismissal for lack of jurisdiction under the antitrust laws where none of defendant's products were shipped in interstate commerce or shown to substantially affect
interstate commerce); Marston v. Ann Arbor Property Managers Ass'n, 422 F.2d 836 (6th
Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 929 (1970) (dismissed for failure to allege substantial adverse impact on interstate commerce on the part of an agreement to fix prices
for the rental of local real estate); Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State Disposal Co.,
420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1969) (exclusive franchise for garbage disposal did not affect Interstate commerce merely because containers were leased from out-of-state company); Lieberthai v. North Country Lanes, Inc., 332 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1964) (interstate purchase of supplies to equip bowling alley conducting a local business did not make activity Interstate);
Savon Gas Stations Number Six, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 309 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 911 (1963) (restrictive covenants in shopping center lease giving a gasoline
company exclusive rights to operate a service station does not involve interstate commerce) ;
Page v. Work, 290 F.2d 323, 329-30 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 875 (1961) (purchase
of newsprint and other supplies does not affect interstate commerce where there is no showing of any effect on interstate commerce).
19. "[Clommerce among the States is not a technical legal conception, but a practical
one, drawn from the course of business." Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398
(1905). See also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). However, questions involving commerce still trouble the courts, and their conclusions are often unpredictable. Cf. Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co., 94 S. Ct. 2108 (1974), rev'g 35 Ohio St.
2d 166, 298 N.E.2d 559 (1973) (state court held state could not tax goods because they
were in the flow of foreign commerce).
20. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
21. Id. at 351-52.
22. Id. at 346.
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the state. A state-created commission was empowered to ensure that the program
was carried out fairly.23 The actual determination of a reasonable price for the
individual commodity was left to the discretion of the state's supervisory commission.2 Its composition was likewise fixed by the legislature to ensure fairness
in the implementation and operation of the Act.m
In fashioning this exemption the Court stressed that the state legislature provided the impetus for such regulation and created the machinery for carrying it
out.26 Thus, it was not a situation in which individuals were given a grant of
immunity for past or future disregard of antitrust provisions. 27
The Supreme Court has not had occasion since Parker to apply the doctrine
to a similar set of facts. The Fourth Circuit, however, has had several opportunities to construe and apply this principle.
In the first of these cases, Asheville Tobacco Board of Trade, Inc. v. FTC,*3
the court refused to extend the state immunity principle to local tobacco boards
of trade. The court pointed to the fact that such boards had been functioning
in their present capacity long before action was taken by the state legislature.
The lack of state initiative, combined with the absence of any active state supervision of the boards made application of the Parker exemption inappropriate. -' g
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Lanier,3° a state law forbade insurance companies
from offering rates lower than those established by a state-created rating bureau.
The bureau was constituted from the ranks of the insurance companies, and was
subject to regulation by the State Commissioner of Insurance. This restraint was
held permissible under Parker.31
More recently, the Fourth Circuit in Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia
Electric & Power Co.,32 held that the promotional practices pursued by the
23. Id.
24. Id. at 355. This the commission accomplished by holding in a "surplus pool" suf-

ficient raisins to support prices in the manner desired. Id. at 348.
25. Id. at 346.

26. Id. at 352. Under the plan, a commission including the Director of Agriculture,
ex-offido, and eight appointees of the Governor (confirmed by the State Senate) administered
the marketing plan. Id. at 346.
27. Id. at 351.
28. 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959).
29. Id. at 509-10. "It [the state] may even permit persons subject to such control to
participate in the regulation, provided their activities are adequately supervised by ind2pendent state officials." Id. at 509. While the court was not considering the Sherman Act,
it nevertheless appears that the Parker rationale was controlling. See discussion in Goldfarb
v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1, 7 n.15 (4th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3087
(US. Aug. 13, 1974) (No. 74-70).
30. 361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930 (1966).
31. Id. at 871. "[Tlhe rating bureau was established and administered under the active
supervision of the State .... " Id.
32. 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971). An even more recent decision of the Fourth Circuit
construing the Parker exemption is Business Aides, Inc. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co.,
480 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1973) (no antitrust violation for compliance with state-authorized
regulation).
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defendant electric company, intended to restrict competition with the plaintiff
gas company, were not subject to antitrust sanctions since the state was charged
with the regulation of public utilities and had created a commission to oversee
their activities.83 Plaintiff argued that there could be no exemption in the absence of affirmative action by an independent supervisory body. The court
replied:
The argument is not without merit but the conclusion is not inevitable unless one
equates administrative silence with abandonment of administrative
duty. It is just as
84
sensible to infer that silence means consent, i.e., approval.
This would appear to be the furthest any court has been willing to go to find
a state exemption.8 5 Presented with a set of facts almost identical to those of
Washington Gas Light, the Fifth Circuit took note of that decision but stated
that it chose not to extend the rationale adopted there.80 Likewise, the First
Circuit made the following observation:
The [Parker] Court's emphasis on the extent of the state's involvement precludes
the facile conclusion that action by any public official automatically confers exemption. . . . Our reading of Parker convinces us that valid government action confers
antitrust immunity only when government determines that competition is not the
summum bonum in a particular
field and deliberately attempts to provide an alternate
87
form of public regulation.
The third possible basis for excluding the legal profession from the sanctions
of the Sherman Act is under the so-called "learned profession" exemption. The
two principal cases generally cited as authority for this proposition are Federal
8
Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,0
and
39
FTC v. Raladam Co. In the former, the profession of baseball was held immune from antitrust restrictions on the grounds that interstate commerce was
not involved. 40 The Court, however, stated in dictum that "personal effort, not
related to production, is not a subject of commerce."141 In Raladam, where the
professional exemption issue also was unrelated to the actual decision, the Court
observed in dictum that "medical practitioners.., are not in competition with
respondent. They follow a profession and not a trade .... -42
33. 438 F.2d at 252.
34. Id.

35. Norman's on the Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 444 F.2d 1011, 1018 (3d Cir. 1971).
36. Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135, 1140 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1062 (1972).
37.

George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 30 (1st

Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
38.

259 U.S. 200 (1922).

39. 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
40.
41.
42.

259 U.S. at 209.
Id. (dictum).
283 U.S. at 653 (dictum).
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The Supreme Court at least has indicated that the professional exemption is
not absolute.4 3 Thus, in United States v. National Association of Real Estate
Boards, the Court rejected the contention that the professional services of
brokers were not embraced by the term "trade." In holding a fee schedule which
was part of a code of ethics to be violative of the antitrust laws, the Court
stated:
The competitive standards which the Act sought to preserve in the field of trade
and commerce seem as relevant to the brokerage business as to other branches of
commercial activity.4 5

Concerning the first of these three possible bases for exemption-lack of effect
on interstate commerce-the district court in Goldfarb found substantial involvement with commerce, including, inter alia, that a significant portion of home
financing comes from outside the state; that lenders require title examination
and title insurance; that many of the purchasers commute to work through the
channels of commerce; and that many mortgages are guaranteed by federal
is suffiagencies. 46 Consequently, the lower court concluded that "commerce
' 47
ciently affected to sustain jurisdiction under the Sherman Act."
43. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 491-92 (1950).
("We do not intimate an opinion on the correctness of the application of the term [trade]
to the professions."). American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528 (1943)
("[Whether a physician's practice .. .constitutes trade under § 3 of the Sherman Act ...
we need not consider or decide .

. . .").

It should be observed that the concept of trade

in section 3 of the Sherman Act is identical to that defined in section 1. The former section
merely gives the Act jurisdiction over the District of Columbia and United States possessions and territories, which are not embraced by Congress' constitutional authorization
over commerce among the states. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3 (1970). Furthermore, American
Medical Ass'n v. United States suggested that professional status is "immaterial" when
a criminal conspiracy to violate the antitrust laws is involved. 317 U.S. at 528.
44. 339 U.S. 485 (1950).
45. Id. at 492. In his dissent, Justice Jackson noted:
"I am not persuaded that fixing uniform fees for the broker's labor is more offensive
to the antitrust laws than fixing uniform fees for the labor of a lawyer, a doctor, a carpenter, or a plumber." Id. at 496 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
The Supreme Court appears to distinguish between commercial and non-commercial aspects of the professions. The Court seems to be willing to condone the incidental infringement
of free enterprise where it involves the professional organizations' right to pass judgment
on qualifications and conduct of their members. See Marjorie Webster Junior College v.
Middle States Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 654-55 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 US. 965 (1970) (refusal to grant accreditation held not in restraint
of trade). But where strictly commercial aspects of the profession are involved, the professional status of the particular organization will not be recognized as a defense. See American
Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 US. 519 (1943); Northern CaL Pharmaceutical Ass'n
v. United States, 306 F.2d 379, 385 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 US. 862 (1962) (price fixing) ;
United States v. Utah Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 29 (D. Utah), aiPd per curiam,
371 U.S. 24 (1962) (price fixing). See generally Comment, Minimum Fee Schedules as Price
Fixing: A Per Se Violation of The Sherman Act, 22 Am. U.L. Rev. 439, 452-53 (1973).
46. 355 F. Supp. at 494.
47. Id.
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The court of appeals disagreed with this finding of fact, asserting that any
effect of the minimum fee schedule on interstate commerce was either indirect
or insubstantial. 48 The fact that many persons commuted to out-of-state jobs
was deemed irrelevant to the issue of substantial effect. 49 With respect to the title
examination required by lenders, the court found that this act was wholly intrastate, notwithstanding the interstate flow of the mortgage funds.50
Arguably, the Goldfarb court erred in its narrow conception of the commerce
power. The reluctance of the court to rely on this ground alone may belie some
doubt on their part. As the district court 5 ' and the dissenting opinion in the
court of appeals found, 52 the minimum fee schedule has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. The court of appeal's conclusion that "[t]he fact that a
service is occasionally utilized to facilitate interstate activities does not subject
the one providing that service to the proscriptions of the Sherman Act,"5' seems
inaccurate when all the evidence is considered. As the dissent points out, "the
Supreme Court has consistently approved congressional regulation of local
activities that have a potential for affecting interstate commerce."' 4 Of course,
even a slight retreat from the broad scope recently given to the commerce clause
could justify the majority's reasoning and render moot the other questions regarding possible exemptions. 5
If this holding were valid, it would, as the dissenting opinion points out, 0
foreclose the need for further discussion since the Sherman Act would be renreached this holding only after disdered inapplicable. However, the majority
57
cussing the other bases of exemption.
As to the second contention-that the minimum fee schedules formed part
of a system of state regulation and therefore were exempt under Parker-the
court of appeals stressed three criteria essential for the state regulation exemption. These were public benefit, legislative authorization, and state supervision. 8
A public benefit was found since fee schedules uphold high ethical standards. 9
A state law authorized the Virginia Supreme Court to regulate the practice of
law and establish a state bar for this purpose. Since the Virginia court was authorized to set ethical standards and had indicated that minimum fee schedules
form a part of such standards, the Goldfarb court reasoned that the setting of
48. 497 F.2d at 16-17.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 17.
51. 355 F. Supp. at 494.
52. 497 F.2d at 21 (Craven, J., concurring and dissenting).
53. Id. at 17.
54. Id. at 22 (Craven, J., concurring and dissenting).
55. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
56. 497 F.2d at 21 (Craven, J., concurring and dissenting).
57. Id. at 16-19.
58. Id. at 6.
59. Id. at 9-10. The court cited Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961) for this proposition. 497 F.2d at 10 n.29. However, Lathrop dealt with compulsory bar association dues,
and does not appear to support the Goldfarb assertion that minimum fees benefit the public.
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minimum fee schedules by the Virginia court's administrative arm, the State
Bar, was well within the scope of the regulatory powers duly delegated by the
legislature. 60 Finally, the court found that the silence of the Virginia Supreme
Court on the issue of minimum fees signified tacit approval similar to that
found in Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co. 2
It is submitted that the application of Parker to Goldfarb constitutes a considerable dilution of Parker. First, the court's general designation of the first
requisite as "public benefit" states the situation in Parker in an overbroad
fashion which does not fully comprehend the exacting nature of the policy underlying the original exemption granted in Parker.0 3 That case involved more than
the casual assumption that a policy of state-imposed restraints on competition
would benefit the public. Rather it involved a studied determination that in a
particular instance the ordinary laws of supply and demand achieved results
which were undesirable. To the extent that the preservation of the state's agricultural resources insured that there would be an adequate supply of products
for the consumer it could be said to have benefited the public. Goldfarb ignores
the caveat of Parker that it must be demonstrably proved that the situation
justifies institution of state-imposed restraints. 4
As to the presence of the second requirement of state legislative authorization,
the state legislature authorized the state court to regulate (and the state bar to
administer) the profession. But the stretching of that initial grant of authority
over regulation to embrace the power to fix minimum prices may present some
question as to whether this exceeds the scope of the original authorization.3
The argument that since fees relate to the question of ethics, there is an implied
power to fix minimum fees in the interest of ethics, runs counter to the Supreme
Court's repeated admonition that in the field of antitrust laws exemptions are
not to be lightly implied. 66
Perhaps most fatal to the application of the Parker doctrine is the absence of
60. 497 F.2d at 11-12. Va. Code Ann. § 54-48 (1972) gives the state court of appeals the
power to regulate the practice of law, formulate a code of ethics for attorneys and judges,
and establish measures for disciplinary action. Id. § 54-49 authorizes the state court to
regulate the Virginia State Bar, which was to act as the administrative agency of the court.
61. "Finally, the Virginia court's inaction with regard to specifically approving or disapproving the schedules in question should not be construed as a failure to adequately supervise." 497 F.2d at 11.
62. 438 F.2d 248, 252 (4th Cir. 1971); see notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
63. See notes 20-27 supra and accompanying text. See also Simmons & Fornader, State
Regulation as an Antitrust Defense: An Analysis of the Parker v. Brown Doctrine, 43 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 61 (1974).
64. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943). See text accompanying notes 22, 37

supra.
65. 497 F.2d at 20-21 (Craven, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Craven noted that
the question of the authority of the State Bar to promulgate minimum fee schedules "can
best be left to the Supreme Court of Virginia." Id.
66. United States v. First City Natl Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 368 (1967); United States v.
Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350 (1963).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 43

the active and independent supervision by the state. 7 Inherent in the concept
of state-regulation which abridges the normal laws of the marketplace is the
principle that there be vigilant independent supervision to prevent the occurrence
of the type of abuse the antitrust laws were intended to eliminate, specifically
the arbitrary manipulation of prices to the advantage of those having a pecuniary
interest in increased prices. Parker did not authorize the growers and producers
to get together to arrange prices among their fellows, 8 nor did Allstate authorize
insurance rates absent state approval.6 9 The courts in applying the Parker doctrine, where those subject to state-sponsored restraints have been allowed to participate in the process, have been consistent in their insistence on independent
approval by the state. 0 The only way to maintain that there is active supervision of the minimum fee schedule set by the Bar via a questionable assumption
analogous to that articulated by the Fourth Circuit in Washington Gas Light:71
72
that the Virginia State court's silence meets the requirement of supervision.
This equation it is submitted, cannot be made without drastically changing the
concept of the words "active" and "independent" as they were used in Parker.
Such an inference disregards the elaborate safeguards in Parker which were
carefully applied to the plan to ensure objectivity and fairness in its operation.
Yet even conceding the validity of Washington Gas Light's holding that lack of
action constitutes approval by a supervisory body, there is no equivalent set
of circumstances in Goldfarb on which to base such an inference. There is nothing
to suggest that the Virginia Supreme Court, the supposedly active and independent supervisor, was aware of even the existence of Fairfax County's minimum
7
fee schedule, let alone the rates for the individual services specified.
74
While the district court entertained reservations both as to the legitimacy
67. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
68. 317 U.S. at 346.
69. 361 F.2d at 871.
70. George R. Whitten Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 30 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502, 509
(4th Cir. 1959).

71. Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir.
1971), discussed at text accompanying note 34 supra.
72. 438 F.2d at 252.
73. "Whatever that [Virginia Supreme] court may think of the power claimed for it to
equate price fixing with legal ethics, I think it will be surprised to learn that it is engaged
in active supervision of the State Bar's implementation of minimum fee schedules in Virginia.
I find nothing in the record to suggest that the Virginia court even knew that Fairfax County
Bar Association had a minimum fee schedule, or that it approved it either directly or in.
directly through the State Bar." 497 F.2d at 21 (Craven, J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
74. Reasons generally advanced by the proponents of minimum fee schedules Include
the following: (1) to ensure a respectable standard of living for lawyers; (2) to deter
"shopping" for legal services; (3) to aid the public in determining what Is considered a
reasonable fee; (4) to assist the judiciary in the same regard; (5) to aid new lawyers In
determining a reasonable value for their services; and (6) to provide for differences In competency among attorneys by fixing a fee for reasonable competency in the performance of
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and applicability of the "learned profession" exemption, 75 the court of appeals
obviously was not disturbed by the lower court's doubts. Cognizant of the fact
that more recent decisions of the Supreme Court had refrained from expressing
an opinion on the validity of a special category exempting the professions, the
court nevertheless felt that the principle continued to have viability. In so
doing, they relied principally on Federal Baseball," Raladam,78 and Atlantic
Cleaners and Dyers, Inc. v. United States.7 9 Atlantic in turn relied upon a preSherman Act case, The [Schooner] Nymph,8 0 in which Justice Story in defining
the term "trade" excluded the liberal arts and "the learned professions." 8'
Although it is true that "forms of competition usual in the business world may
be demoralizing to the ethical standards of a profession,' 18 2 it is presumptuous
designated services. Arnould & Corley, Fee Schedules Should Be AbolisJhed, 57 A.B.A.J. 655,
656 (1971). Thirty-four states had such schedules at the time of this survey. Id. The policy
aspects of minimum fee schedules have been discussed widely. See, e.g., Miller & Weil, Let's
Improve, Not Kill, Fee Schedules, 58 A.B.A.J. 31 (1972); Morgan, Where Do We Go from
Here with Fee Schedules, 59 A.BP..J. 1403 (1973); Comment, Minimum Fee Schedules as
Price Fixing: A Per Se Violation of the Sherman Act, 22 Am. U.L. Rev. 439 (1973); Note,
A Critical Analysis of Bar Association Minimum Fee Schedules, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 971 (1972) ;
Note, The Antitrust Division v. The Professions--"No Bidding" Clauses and Fee Schedules,
48 Notre Dame Law. 966 (1973). However, such arguments appear irrelevant.
"[Tihere is no defense to price-fixing on the ground that it is reasonable or that it is being done by professionals. Appellants' 'professional' status per se will not protect them if the
activity in which they are shown to have engaged is clearly proscribed by the statute."
Northern Cal. Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States, 306 F.2d 379, 385 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962).
75. "The Court has some question whether the adoption of a minimum fee schedule is
itself 'professional.' It seems to the Court that there is a basic inconsistency between the
lofty position that professional services, not commodities, are here involved and the position
that a minimum fee schedule is proper. The former properly contemplates differences in
abilities, worth and energies expended of those rendering the services. Such differences are
made as meaningless by a minimum fee schedule as they would be by a maximum fee
schedule. Although there is as yet no evidence of this here, the minimum fee schedule does
permit the charging, by an attorney, of more than the services are worth. Certainly fee setting is the least 'learned' part of the profession." 355 F. Supp. at 495.
76. 497 F.2d at 13-14. The most recent Supreme Court comments on the learned
profession exemption have been dicta in conspiracy cases. See United States v. National
Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 491-92 (1950) and American Medical Ass'n v. United
States, 317 US. 519, 528 (1943). While the learned profession exemption appears inapplicable in antitrust suits involving criminal conspiracies, see note 43 supra, nevertheless, they
may arguably fare better in a civil suit for damages.
77. 259 U.S. 200 (1922); see note 41 supra and accompanying text.
78. 283 U.S. 643 (1931); see note 42 supra and accompanying text.
79. 286 U.S. 427 (1932). There the Court, in determining whether dry cleaning was a
"trade," discussed the meaning of this term. Id. at 431-37.
80. 18 F. Cas. 506 (No. 10,387) (S.D.N.Y. 1834).
81. Id. at 507.
82. United States v. Oregon Medical Socy, 343 US. 326, 336 (1952), cited at 497 F.2d
at 14.
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to conclude that the Court is necessarily saying that the concept of competitive
pricing is incompatible with those ethical standards. In support of its application
of the learned profession exemption the majority notes that "the proscriptions
of the Sherman Act were 'tailored ... for the business world,' not for the noncommercial aspects of the liberal arts and the learned professions." 83 Query
whether minimum fees constitute a "noncommercial aspect of the . . . learned
84
professions.

Thomas P. Milton, Jr.
Criminal Law-Conspiracy-Defendant Cannot Be Convicted of Conspiracy to Assault Federal Officer without Knowledge of His Victims
Federal Identity.-Hall, a federal narcotics undercover agent working
through an informer, negotiated the purchase of a half-kilo of heroin from an
unlawful supplier, 'Feola. Another undercover agent, Hall and the informer met
Feola and his companions, Farr, Alsondo and Rosa, in an apartment in Manhattan to complete the transaction. Farr and his accomplices had substituted
sugar for the heroin and planned to rob the buyers if they discovered the switch
before paying the agreed amount. When the informer announced his desire to
inspect the merchandise at the meeting, defendants realized that discovery of
the substitution was imminent. Alsondo drew a gun and a struggle ensued as
defendants attempted to flee, but the agents finally subdued the group. Alsondo,'
Rosa, Feola, and Farr 2 were tried and convicted on charges of assaulting a
federal officer under 18 4U.S.C. § 1113 and of conspiring to commit that offense
under 18 U.S.C. § 371.
83. 497 F.2d at 14 n.41, quoting Marjorie Webster junior College, Inc. v. Middle
States Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 654 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970) (footnotes omitted). The court has, in addition, omitted the
next sentence of Webster: "In these contexts, an incidental restraint of trade, absent an intent or purpose to affect the commercial aspects of the profession, is not sufficient to warrant
application of the antitrust laws." 432 F.2d at 654.
84. See note 45 supra. The courts have been presented with another opportunity to
answer this and other issues raised in Goldfarb. United States v. Oregon State Bar, Civil No.
74-362 (D. Ore., filed May 9, 1974). It is interesting to note that the Government began
this action the day following the Goldfarb decision.
1 Asondo was also convicted for unlawfully carrying a firearm during the commission
of a felony, violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2) (1970). United States v. Alsondo, 486 F.2d
1339, modified on rehearing, 486 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted sub nom. United
States v. Feola, 94 S. Ct. 1932 (1974).
2. On a separate appeal, Farr's conviction on the assault was affirmed but the conviction on the conspiracy was reversed and the charges dismissed. United States v. Farr,
487 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.SL.W. 3379 (U.S. Dec. 19,
1973) (No. 73-953). Farr is challenging the validity of the nonscienter rule in the federal
assault conviction
3. 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1970) [hereinafter cited as section 111] provides in pertinent part:
"Whoever forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any
person . . . while engaged in or on account of the performance of his official duties, shall
be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both."
4. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970) [hereinafter cited as section 371] provides in pertinent part:
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Although it affirmed--either initially or on rehearing-the convictions of all
four individuals on the substantive assault offense,9 the court of appeals reversed
the convictions on the conspiracy charge, holding that the government's failure
to prove defendants' knowledge of the official identity of their victims necessitated the dismissal of that charge.6 United States v. Alsondo, 486 F.2d 1339,
modified on rehearing, 486 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted sub norn.
United States v. Feola, 94 S. Ct. 1932 (1974).
The Alsondo decision raises the problem of reconciling the scienter requirements of the federal conspiracy and assault statutes.
Scienter refers to "defendant's . . . previous knowledge . . of facts which
it was his duty to guard against ....,,M
Lower court cases have held uniformly
that defendants prosecuted under the federal assault statute need not have
knowledge that their victims were federal officers, acting in an official capacity,
in order to be found guilty of violating the statute. Thus, scienter is not an element of the offense. 8
This lack of a scienter requirement suggests that the federal statute is analytically indistinguishable from any state assault statute.9 Most states have
codified the common law offense of assault which required merely intent to
injure.10 The identity of the victim was not and still remains unimportant to
the offense of simple assault. Since state statutes apparently provide ample op"If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States,
or to defraud the United States ... and one or more of such persons do any act to effect
the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both."
5. United States v. Alsondo, 486 F.2d 1339, modified on rehearing, 486 Fad 1346 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Feola, 94 S. Ct 1932 (1974).
6. Id. at 1344.
7. Black's Law Dictionary 1512 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) ; see Morissette v. United States, 342
U.S. 246, 252 (1952) (guilty knowledge); United States v. Dotterv-ch, 320 U.S. 277, 281
(1943) (awareness of some wrongdoing); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251 (1922)
(knowledge); People v. Gould, 237 Mich. 156, 163-64, 211 N.W. 346, 348-49 (1926) (design,
understanding, knowledge, guilty knowledge); Horton v. Tyree, 104 W. Va. 238, 242, 139
S.E. 737, 738 (1927) (actual knowledge, indifference to truth or falsity).
8. United States v. Fernandez, 497 F.2d 730, 736 (9th Cir. 1974) (undercover narcotics
agent); United States v. Langone, 445 F.2d 636, 637 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 915
(1971) (undercover narcotics agent); United States v. Goodwin, 440 F.2d 1152, 1155-56
(3d Cir. 1971) (F.B.I. agents); United States v. Linn, 438 F.2d 456, 459 (10th Cir. 1971)
(postal employee); United States v. Leach, 429 F2d 956, 963 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 986 (1971) (narcotics agent) ; United States v. Ulan, 421 F.2d 787, 789 (2d Cir. 1970)
(federal deputy marshal); United States v. Kartman, 417 F.d 893, 894 (9th Cir. 1969)
(federal deputy marshal); United States v. Wallace, 368 F2d 537, 539 (4th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 976 (1967) (revenue agent).
9. E.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 120.00(1) (McKinney 1967) sets forth the scienter requirement
for assault in the third degree: "With intent to cause physical injury to another person,
he causes such injury to such person. .. ." Other states have similar provisions. See, e.g, Cal.
Penal Code § 240 (West 1970); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40-2-33 (1963); 11. Ann. Stat. ch.
38, § 12-1 (Smith-Hurd 1972); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2901.25 (Page 1954); Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 18, § 2701 (1973); Tex. Penal Code art. 22.01 (1974).
10. W. LaFave & A. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law 603 (1972).
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portunity for prosecution of criminals who commit assaults," the federal government's motive in creating a separate assault statute is not readily apparent. One
must look to the reasons advanced for its enactment.
In a letter to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in 1934,12 Attorney
General Homer Cummings recommended that such legislation be enacted so that
the federal government would not have to rely on state prosecution of criminal
acts against federal personnel acting in their official capacity.' 3 He hoped that
such legislation would further the purposes of the federal government through
effective protection of its law-enforcement officials.' 4
The committee's reluctance "to withdraw exclusive jurisdiction from the
State courts"' 15 over assaults suggests congressional desire to limit the conduct
proscribed in the statute to the knowing assault on a federal officer.' 0
Other history on this particular legislation is sparse. However, the Supreme
Court considered the purpose of the enactment in Ladner v. United States.17
Ladner wounded two federal officers with a single shot from his weapon. He
was convicted on two assault counts and sentenced to two consecutive ten year
prison terms. Ladner contended that he was guilty of only one assault under
the terms of the statute. The Supreme Court agreed with his argument and
reversed his conviction.' 8 Reviewing the meager legislative history of the statute,
the Court felt its main aim was "to prevent hindrance to the execution of official
duty, and thus to assure the carrying out of federal purposes and interests .... "19
The protection of the persons of federal officers was a subordinate considera11. See note 9 supra.
12. Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 174-75 n.3 (1958) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 254
(1940), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1970)).
13. Id. at 174-75 n.3. "[RIesort must usually be had to the local police court, which affords but little relief to us, under the circumstances, in our effort to further the legitimate
purposes of the Federal Government." Id.
14. Id.
15. 78 Cong. Rec. 8127 (1934) (remarks of Mr. Sumners). The legislative history of this
assault statute is meager, principally comprising Attorney General Cummings' letter to the
Senate Committee on the judiciary. Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 174 (1958).
However, it was evident that "[ujndue expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction was unacceptable to the Congress that adopted the statute that now is section 111." United States v.
Fernandez, 497 F.2d 730, 746 (9th Cir. 1974) (Hufstedler, J., concurring).
16. "Congress was seeking to avoid creation of a federal crime that was wholly duplicative of a state crime." United States v. Fernandez, 497 F.2d 730, 746 (9th Cir. 1974) (Hufstedler, J., concurring). Since the aim of the statute is to further the purposes of the federal
government, knowledge that one is encountering a federal officer seems essential to the offense.
Id.
17. 358 U.S. 169 (1958).
18. Id. at 179. "[TIhe single discharge of the shotgun would constitute an 'assault' without regard to the number of federal officers affected .. . ." Id. at 177.
19. Id. at 176. "Support for this meaning may be found in the fact that .. .it [is] unlawful not only to assault federal officers engaged on official duty but also forcibly to resist,
oppose, impede, intimidate or interfere with such officers." Id.
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tion.20 For this reason, the act of hindering the federal officers as they carry

out their official duties would be the sole criminal act. 21 The form of the hindrance and the number of federal personnel involved would be insignificanLm
Although the Court did not discuss the scienter requirement of the statute,
knowledge of the federal identity of one's victim seems essential if the true
purpose of the statute is to be served. Only one who has knowledge of the fact
that he is interfering with a federal officer's performance of his duties will be
deterred by the federal statute.P
Subsequent decisions in lower federal courts appear to have deviated from
the Ladner interpretation of the statute's purpose. These cases indicate that
the basic purpose of the statute is to provide a convenient federal forum when
the offenses within the statute are committed against a federal officer.24 The defendant's lack of knowledge of the federal identity of his victim is irrelevant
to such a construction of the statute. A federal prosecution requires only that
the defendant have the general intent to assault someone and that his victim
prove to be a federal officer.25
This interpretation seems to expand the scope of the statute and to enlarge
federal jurisdiction over assault.20 For example, in United States v. Langone,7
a federal narcotics undercover agent, on his way to meet an informer, parked
his automobile in front of defendant's funeral home. Defendant, unaware of the
identity of the agent or of the nature of his activities, objected to the agent's
leaving his vehicle in that place, became violent and shoved the agent against
20. Id.
21. Id. The court did not believe that Congress intended a person who prevented federal
officers from entering a building "might commit as many crimes as there are officers denied

entry:" Id.
22.

Id. at 177.

23. United States v. Fernandez, 497 F.2d 730, 744-45 (9th Cir. 1974) (Hufsteder, I.,
concurring).
24. "Congress merely sought to provide a federal forum for the trial of cases involving
various offenses against federal officers in the performance of official duties." United States
v. Lombardozzi, 335 F.2d 414, 416 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 US. 914 (1954) (assault
on a federal agent conducting surveillance of a funeral); accord, United States v. Goodwin,
440 F.2d 1152, 1155 (3d Cir. 1971) (assault on two F.B.I. agents) ; United States v. Kartman,
417 F.2d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 1969) (assault on a federal deputy marshal).

25. See note 8 supra.
26. See notes 12-16 supra and accompanying text. The courts, as a result, are affirming
convictions on substantive counts even when defendants are unaware of the federal identity
of their victims and have no intent to thwart the federal government. E.g., United States v.
Fernandez, 497 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1974) (defendants unaware that assault victim was a federal
undercover agent; conviction affirmed); United States v. Alsondo, 486 F.2d 1339, modified
on rehearing, 486 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Feola,
94 S.Ct. 1932 (1974) (same) ; United States v. Maynard, 452 F.2d 1087 (1st Cir. 1971) (per
curiam) (same); United States v. Langone, 445 F.2d 636 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 404 US.
915 (1971) (same).
27. 445 F.2d 636 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 US. 915 (1971).
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the car. 28 Defendant was convicted of assaulting a federal officer who was
engaged in official activities.2 9 The court rejected defendant's argument that
the government was required to prove defendant knew the victim was a federal
officer, declaring that such a requirement would weaken the effectiveness of the
statute.80 Similar reasoning is found in a recent decision, United States v.
Fernandez,81 where the Ninth Circuit recognized that defendants who attacked
a federal narcotics undercover agent, believing him to be a drug pusher, quite
possibly never would have assaulted him if they had known his federal identity. 2
However, the court affirmed their convictions83 because it felt only Congress had
the power to change the elements of the statute to include scienter.8 4
Judge Hufstedler, concurring in Fernandez, re-examined the legislative intent
behind the statute. She felt that the main purpose of the statute is the "facilitation of certain federal officials' law enforcement efforts," 39 rather than the protection of individuals.86 She also noted the similarity between the intent of the
federal statute and that of certain state statutes which punish the knowing
assault on state law enforcement officers.8 7 These state statutes require more
than the simple intent to injure; to be convicted, a defendant must know that
his victim is a law enforcement officer.88 Such "aggravated assault"8 0 would
be more analogous to the conduct proscribed in the federal statute than would
28. Id. at 636.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 637. "Burdening the government with an obligation to prove knowledge could
seriously impede [the protection of federal officers.]" Id.
31. 497 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1974).
32. Id. at 735, 738.
33. Id. at 740.
34. Id. at 738.
35. Id. at 743 (Hufstedler, J., concurring). "The basic purpose of section 111 is preventing obstruction of justice." Id. "[T]he knowledge requirement is well suited to the purpose
of an obstruction of justice law." Id. at 744.
36. "[If an obstruction of justice statute protects persons, it does so only as a means of
protecting those individuals' functions." Id. at 743.
37. Id. at 745. These statutes include, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 241 (West Supp. 1974);
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40-7-54 (Supp. 1967); Ill.
Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 12-2(b) (Smlth-Hurd
Supp. 1972); N.Y. Penal Law § 120.05(3) (McKinney 1967); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2901.252 (Page Temp. Supp. 1972); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 2702(3) (1973); Tex. Penal
Code art. 22.02(a)(2) (1974).
38. In re Cline, 255 Cal. App. 2d 115, 123, 63 Cal. Rptr. 233, 239 (3d Dist. 1967), cert.
denied, 392 U.S. 938 (1968) (assault with a deadly weapon on a police officer); People v.
Prante, 177 Colo. 243, 248, 493 P.2d 1083, 1085 (1972) (en banc) (assault on a police
officer); People v. Litch, 4 IlL App. 3d 788, 791, 281 N.E.2d 745, 747 (2d Dist. 1972) (assault on a police officer in a stationhouse) ; People v. Wheeler, 59 Misc. 2d 825, 826-27, 300
N.Y.S.2d 362, 364 (Chemung County Ct. 1969), aff'd mem., 36 App. Div. 2d 549, 317
N.Y.S.2d 111 (3d Dep't 1971) (assault on a police officer); Ford v. State, 158 Tex. Crim.
26, 252 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1952).
39. 497 F.2d at 745 (Hufstedler, J., concurring).
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"simple assault. ' 40 Nevertheless, the federal courts generally have not applied
a scienter requirement. 41
The problem of scienter in federal assault cases42 must be contrasted with the
federal courts' treatment of scienter for conviction of conspiracy to commit a
federal offense. In United States v. Mack,43 where the substantive offense of
keeping and failing to register an alien prostitute did not require defendant's
knowledge of alienage,44 the court affirmed a conspiracy conviction.5 Speaking
through Judge Learned Hand, the court reasoned that the proof established
that "the parties had in contemplation all the elements of the crime they are
charged with conspiracy to commit." ' 46 Defendant in Mack acted at his peril and
was "chargeable . . . with knowledge that the proscribed conduct [was] .. .
unlawful."'47 In this case, the federal element of alienage seems to be merely
a basis for jurisdiction over defendant.
However, in United States v. Crimmins,48 where the substantive offense of
causing stolen bonds to be transported in interstate commerce did not require
defendant's knowledge that the bonds would cross state lines, the court, speaking
through Judge Hand, reversed a conspiracy conviction4" since "the conspiracy
simply did not include that element of the crime." 50 Since interstate transportation seems to be an essential part of the agreement, knowledge of interstate
transportation must be established independently of the act of transporting the
bonds. Although these two cases suggested a dual approach to the scienter element in federal conspiracies, most subsequent cases adopted the Crimmins
rationale that knowledge of the federal element must be part of the conspirators
agreement. 51
40. Id. On the basis of this analogy, Judge Hufstedler concluded that "[a] statute
proscribing assaults on peace officers should be interpreted as requiring proof of knowledge
of the status of the victim.' Id.
41. See note 8 supra.
42. See notes 8-41 supra and accompanying text.
43. 112 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1940).
44. Id. at 292. "[A] person entertaining an alien prostitute is liable regardless of his
knowledge that she is an alien." Id. (citation omitted).
45. Id. at 293.
46. Id. at 292. Accord, Wilkerson v. United States, 41 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1930), cert.
denied, 282 U.S. 894 (1931) (conspiracy to violate National Motor Vehicle Theft Act). The
substantive statute did not require that defendant have knowledge that the stolen property
was part of interstate commerce, so the court did not feel it was necessary to prove such
knowledge for conspiracy to violate the statute. Id. at 656.
47. 112 F.2d at 292.
48. 123 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1941).
49. Id. at 274.
50. Id. at 273. Since defendant was unaware that the bonds had crossed state lines and
since the agreement did not include an intended violation of federal law, his conviction was
reversed. Id.
51. E.g., Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672 (1959) (conspiracy to defeat payment of
federal taxes on lottery operations) ; Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954) (conspiracy
to violate the federal mail fraud statute and the National Stolen Property Act); United
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In United States v. Roselli,52 the Ninth Circuit departed from the Crimmins
rationale and moved toward the Mack reasoning. There, defendants appealed
their convictions for conspiring to use interstate commerce to facilitate racketeering. The court stated that the gist of section 371 "is an agreement . . . to
commit the substantive crime."53 Use of interstate commerce, the court continued, merely established jurisdiction in federal court for the prosecution of
defendants who planned a crime that "is in fact and law a federal offense."6 4
Since knowing use of interstate commerce was not an element of the choate
crime, it would not be an element of the corresponding conspiracy."
Despite Roselli, the Second Circuit has consistently reaffirmed the Crimmins
rationale.56 However, the National Commission on the Reform of Federal
States v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1974) (conspiracy
to deal in stolen securities moved in interstate commerce); United States v. Vilhottl, 452
F.2d 1186 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972) (conspiracy to buy, receive, or
possess goods stolen from interstate commerce) ; United States v. Cimini, 427 F.2d 129 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970) (conspiracy to steal and convert goods moving in
interstate commerce); Nassif v. United States, 370 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1966) (conspiracy to
steal and convert goods moving in interstate commerce). Something more than wrongful
intent is necessary for conviction under the general federal conspiracy statute. Knowledge of
the federal element involved (interstate commerce, mails, federal officers) establishes "an
intent which is distinctly anti-federal." Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy,
72 Harv. L. Rev. 920, 937 (1959).
52. 432 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971).
53. Id. at 891. "There is no apparent reason for requiring not only proof of a concert
of action that includes all elements of the substantive offense, but also proof of knowledge
of the jurisdictional element that is not required for conviction of the substantive offense."
Id. at 891-92.
54. Id. at 892.
55. Id. at 891-92. The court further declared that "[defendant's] conviction of conspiracy
was proper even if knowledge of the interstate aspects of the illegal scheme is an essential
element of the offense." Id. at 892. Other courts have commented favorably on the RoselUi
rationale. United States v. Polesti, 489 F.2d 822, 824 (7th Cir. 1973) (conspiracy to steal
goods from interstate commerce) (collecting cases); United States v. Iannelli, 477 F.2d 999,
1002 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 2602 (1974) (conspiracy to violate federal gambling laws) ; United States v. Thompson, 476 F.2d 1196, 1199-1200 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 918 (1973) (conspiracy to transport forged checks in interstate commerce) (dictum).
56. United States v. Rizzo, 491 F.2d 1235, 1236 (2d Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (conspiracy
to steal goods from interstate commerce); United States v. Cangiano, 491 F.2d 906, 910 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 3223 (1974) (conspiracy to transport obscene materials In interstate commerce) ; United States v. Houle, 490 F.2d 167, 171-72 (2d Cir. 1973) (conspiracy
to steal goods moving in interstate commerce) ; United States v. DeMarco, 488 F.2d 828, 832
(2d Cir. 1973) (conspiracy to possess goods stolen from interstate commerce) ; United States
v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270, 281-82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973) (conspiracy to
deal in stolen treasury bills moving in interstate commerce); United States v. Fields, 466
F.2d 119, 120-21 (2d Cir. 1972) (conspiracy to receive and possess goods stolen from interstate commerce); United States v. Vilhotti, 452 F.2d 1186, 1189-90 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972) (conspiracy to possess goods stolen from interstate commerce).
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Criminal Laws has urged adoption of the RoseUi approach.57 Knowledge of the
federal element would not be an element of the choate offenses or conspiracy. 8
Rather, the federal element would serve only as the basis for federal jurisdiction. 59
The commission's recommendations were still before Congress when the
Second Circuit in United States v. Alsondo,00 faced the problem of reconciling
the scienter requisite to conspiracy to assault a federal officer with the absence
of such a requirement from the elements of the choate offense.
The court affirmed the assault convictions on the theory that knowledge of
the federal identity of the victim is not an element of the substantive offense
of assaulting a federal officer while he is engaged in the performance of his
duties.61 In so holding, the court followed without question the generally
accepted construction of the assault statute.
The court was more reluctant to follow the Crimmits construction of the conspiracy statute.62 The Alsondo court believed that recognition of the federal
element as a basis for jurisdiction would eliminate the anomaly between the
absence of a knowledge element in the section 111 choate offense and the presence
of the element in the corresponding conspiracy under section 371. 3 The court
57. The Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-801, § 3, go Stat. 1516 created this commission to conduct a "full and complete review and study of the statutory and case law of the
United States . . ." Concerning the commission's proposed Federal Criminal Code, Senator
McClellan has stated that "its treatment of Federal jurisdiction . . . is the keystone of its
suggested reform . . . . The framework underlying the [proposed] Code's treatment of
Federal jurisdiction is the following: Federal penal laws are defined with a focus on punishing misconduct within the Federal jurisdiction, rather than, as is often now the case, some
interference with a jurisdictional factor itself." 117 Cong. Rec. 6127 (1971) (remarks of
Senator McClellan). For a discussion of the proposed Federal Criminal Code and its impact
on the federal law of conspiracy, see generally id. at 6120-33 (remarks of Senator McClellan) ;
Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 Calif. L. Rev. 1137 (1973); McClellan,
Codification, Reform, and Revision: The Challenge of a Modem Federal Criminal Code,
1971 Duke L.J. 663 (1971); Comment, Criminal Conspiracy, 68 Nw. U.L. Rev. 851 (1973).
58. 117 Cong. Rec. 6128 (1971) (remarks of Senator McClellan).
59. Id. at 6131 (remarks of Senator McClellan). "[Jurisdiction would be] no longer a
definitional element of the offense, but instead a 'basis' under which the misconduct becomes
prosecutable by the Federal sovereign, not unlike the showing of the place where the offense
occurred now required to establish state jurisdiction to prosecute." Id.
60. 486 F.2d 1339, modified on rehearing, 486 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted sub
nom. United States v. Feola, 94 S. Ct. 1932 (1974); see notes 1-6 supra and accompanying
text.
61. Id. at 1342. Originally, Alsondo's assault conviction was the only one affirmed by the
court. However, on rehearing, the court also affirmed the assault comictions of codefendants Feola and Rosa on "general agency principles" inasmuch as "the jury must already
have found an agreement ... to assault a victim .. . ." Id. at 1347. Under this rationale, the
court apparently was able to recognize that defendants had agreed to commit a crime, without violating its holding that such a conspiracy could not be punished without defendants'
knowledge that their victims were federal officers.
62. Id. at 1343-44; see notes 48-50 supra and accompanying text.
63. 486 F.2d at 1343.
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also discussed the proposed legislative changes which would reduce the federal
element of section 371 to purely jurisdictional significance."
Alsondo considered distinguishing Crimmins on the grounds that the government's interest in protecting its federal agents might be strong enough to eliminate the knowledge requirement in a conspiracy to assault a federal officer. 5
Ultimately, however, the court felt compelled to uphold Crimmins at least until
legislative changes in the federal penal code superseded it.00 Since defendants
had been unaware that they were conspiring to attack federal officers, the court
67
reversed the conspiracy convictions.
Faced with an opportunity to re-evaluate the scienter requirement in the
federal assault and conspiracy statutes, the Second Circuit in Alsondo chose to
follow the familiar path that had been paved by its predecessors, content to
leave the problem of scienter in these offenses to Congress.
It appears that the only bona fide interest which the federal government has
in a federal assault or a federal conspiracy statute is the protection of the
activities of federal officers. To effectuate this purpose, a scienter requirement
is necessary. Since Congress apparently intended nothing more,0 8 the courts
should be reluctant to expand the scope of federal jurisdiction in this area. Furthermore, in light of the purpose of the federal statutes, there is little logic in
requiring scienter in the conspiracy area and not requiring it in the substantive
offense. Should it grant certiorari in United States v. Farr,0 the Supreme Court
will have an opportunity to decide whether scienter is necessary in the substantive offense. Alternatively, the Court could reject the scienter requirement
in the conspiracy situation when it decides Alsondo. Hopefully, its decisions
will harmonize the scienter requirements of the assault and conspiracy offenses.
Rose Mary Reilly
Securities-Securities Investor Protection Act-Broker's Recovery Depends upon Customer's Conduct.-in February, 1971, petitioner Arenstein
ordered petitioner Coggeshall & Hicks, Inc. (Coggeshall), a brokerage house
with which Arenstein had extensive dealings, to purchase 2,000 shares of Syntex
common stock. Arenstein did not tender payment at that time, and did not have1
sufficient funds in his special account with Coggeshall to complete the purchase.
Coggeshall purchased the shares for $90,933.82. Shortly thereafter, Arenstein
ordered Packer, Wilbur & Co. (Packer Wilbur), another brokerage house with
which he dealt, to sell 2,000 shares of Syntex stock. When Packer Wilbur had
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
1973)

Id.; see notes 57-59 supra and accompanying text.
486 F.2d at 1344.
Id. at 1343.
Id. at 1344; see note 6 supra.
See notes 12-15 supra and accompanying text.
487 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.SL..W. 3379 (U.S. Dec. 19,
(No. 73-953) ; see note 2 supra.

1. At the time of the Second Circuit's decision, Arenstein had not paid for the shares.
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negotiated a sale at $94,203.10, Arenstein ordered Coggeshall to transfer the
shares to Packer Wilbur against payment, which Coggeshall did. Packer Wilbur,
which was experiencing financial difficulties, forwarded two checks to Coggeshall,
knowingly drawn against insufficient funds, and completed the sale of the 2,000
shares to a bona fide purchaser, 2 depositing the $94,203.10 in its own account.
Packer Wilbur's financial condition subsequently worsened and a trustee was
appointed under section 5 of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970
(SIPA) 3 to liquidate the brokerage house, satisfy claims of customers who had
securities or cash on account, and complete certain of its contractual commitments with other broker-dealers. 4 Coggeshall filed a claim with the trustee for
$90,933.82, representing that the non-payment of the Packer Wilbur checks
constituted an "open contractual commitment"' 5 to be completed by the trustee.
Arenstein also filed a claim under section 6 of SIPA,G seeking a $50,000 advance
on his total claim against Packer Wilbur7
The district court8 determined that Arenstein had no right to protection under
SIPA because he was not an innocent customer,9 declaring that Arenstein had
committed a securities margin rule violation (Regulation T10 ) when he ordered
2. A "bona fide purchaser" of a security (defined in Uniform Commercial Code § 8-302
(1962 version) as "a purchaser for value in good faith and without notice of any adverse
claim . . . .") "acquires the security free of any adverse claim." Id. § 8-301(2). "An adverse
claim may be either legal or equitable.. . ." Id. § 8-301, Comment 4.
3. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 § 5(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(b)(3) (1970).
4. The terms "broker" and "dealer" are defined in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§§ 3(a)(4) & (5), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a) (4) & (5) (1970). See generally Douglas & Bates, Stock
"Brokers" as Agents and Dealers, 43 Yale L.J. 46 (1933); Note, The Securities Investor
Protection Act of 1970: A New Federal Role in Investor Protection, 24 Vand. L. Rev. 586
n.2 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SIPA Federal Role]. There is no doubt that Coggeshall is a
broker-dealer within the meaning of the securities acts.
5. Open contractual commitments are "transactions in securities [between broker-dealers]
which were made in the ordinary course of ...business and which were outstanding on
the filing date-(1) in which a customer had an interest... or (2) in which a customer did
not have an interest... [but are deemed by the SEC] to be in the public interest (to complete]." Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 § 6(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(d) (1970).
"Filing date" means the day on which SIPC submits its application for trusteeship. Id.
§ 5(b) (4) (B), 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(b) (4) (B) (1970).
6. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 § 6(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(f) (1970).
7. The claims were, to a large extent, duplicative since any sums collected by Coggeshall
would have been credited to Arenstein's account. See SIPC v. Packer, Vilbur & Co, (19731974 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. f 94,583, at 96,040 n.4 (2d Cir. May 31,
1974).

8. SEC v. Packer, Wilbur & Co., 362 F. Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd sub nom. SIPC
v. Packer, Wilbur & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. UI94,583 (2d
Cir. May 31, 1974).
9. "One who engages in a fraudulent transaction cannot reap the benefits of the Act's
intended protection." Id. at 513-14.
10. 12 C.F.R. § 220.4(c) (1974), promulgated under Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 78(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c) (1970). A customer-investor is prohibited from violating
Regulation T by virtue of Regulation X, 12 C.F.R. § 224 (1974). See Comment, Civil Lia-
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the purchase without sufficient funds in his special cash account and without
intending to pay for the shares before selling. In addition, it indicated that he had
violated rule lob-51 1 by
concealing his true intentions while dealing with the
12
two brokerage houses.
The court found that Coggeshall also had violated Regulation T18 because it
had furthered Arenstein's transaction while on constructive notice that he was
deficient under the margin requirements. Therefore, the court concluded that
Coggeshall could not demand, under SIPA,4 completion of Packer Wilbur's contractual commitment to render payment.'
Arenstein did not appeal the district court's decision. Coggeshall appealed
that part of the decision which denied its request for completion of the open
commitment. In affirming the lower court, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
adopted the district court's holding that protection under SIPA does not extend
to unscrupulous customers.', It indicated, however, without so holding, that
Coggeshall had not violated Regulation T. 16
Nonetheless, it denied Coggeshall's claim for two reasons. First, the court stated
that since commitments to be completed under SIPA are transactions between
brokers on behalf of customers,17 and since Arenstein correctly had been denied
recovery in his own right, "it would hardly serve the cause of statutory consistency to allow Coggeshall to recover ...

under another section."' 8 Secondly,

the court held that the contractual commitment to be completed must be wholly
executory at the time of the demand on the SIPC trustee, whereas in this case
the contract had been partly executed.' 9 SIPC v. Packer, Wilbur & Co., [19731974 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 94,583 (2d Cir. May 31, 1974).
bility for Margin Violations-The Effect of Section 7(f) and Regulation X, 43 Fordham
L. Rev. 93 (1974).
11. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1ob-5 (1974), promulgated under Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
12. 362 F. Supp. at 514. If the transaction had gone as planned, Arensten would have
realized a profit of $3,269.28 without any investment of cash. SIPC v. Packer, Wilbur & Co.,
[1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. U 94,583, at 96,040 (2d Cir. May 31,
1974) [hereinafter cited by page as CCH Binder].
13. 362 F. Supp. at 516. See note 10 supra.
14. 362 F. Supp. at 517.
15. CCH Binder at 96,043. To do otherwise "would in effect be giving succor under one
section of the Securities Exchange Act to a person who violated another section." Id.
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78bbb (1970), provides that
SIPA shall be considered an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-78hh (1970). This Casenote will not treat the issue of the right of a customer to
recover under SIPA for losses arising out of a transaction in which the customer violated
rule lob-5.
16. CCII Binder at 96,044. Coggeshall was not accused of violating § 10(b) or rule 10b-S.
17. See note 5 supra.
18. CCH Binder at 96,043. Arenstein applied for an advance under § 6(f) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(f) (1970); Coggeshall's open contractua commitment claim fell within § 6(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(d) (1970).
19. CCHI Binder at 96,043-44.
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Central to the Second Circuit's rejection of Coggeshall's claim is its finding
that the statutory requirement of an underlying "customer interest" in the transaction between broker-dealers was not satisfied since Arenstein was not an innocent customer 2 o In reaching this conclusion, the court briefly discussed the legislative and economic history prior to SIPA to determine the range of problems
and the classes of people the statute was intended to affect.
SIPA was passed in reaction to the "bear market" condition of the securities
industry during the late 1960's.2 1 As the court of appeals observed in Packer
Wilbur,
[t]he near collapse in 1969 of Hayden Stone and the rumors of impending failures
of other brokerage houses cast a pall over Wall Street that was reminiscent of its
never-to-be-forgotten "Black Tuesday." The industry naturally feared that the breakdown of these houses would be attended by a general decline in public confidence in
the securities market. Congress soon became concerned for the state of the market
and in particular for the plight of the many small investors who fell victim to the
22
economic demise of their brokers.
SIPA was designed to provide a2 3limited amount of insurance protection to customer-investors in this situation.
The plight of the investor was found to be a result of the manner of operation
of the securities industry. 24 Prior to SIPA's enactment broker-dealers had almost
unlimited use of customer-investors' cash and securities. They could use the cash
to finance the margin purchases of other customer-investors, and even to satisfy
general business expenses.2 5 When broker-dealers intentionally or negligently
failed to comply with anti-hypothecation provisions 2 0 customers often found it
very difficult to obtain reimbursement upon their broker-dealer's dissolution. In
some cases, customers might recover their cash balance or securities from the
receiver in bankruptcy-but only after lengthy liquidation proceedings.2 In
other cases, they might never recover, or at best receive a small pro rata distribution, if the broker had wasted or misapplied most of its assets.2
20. See notes 43 and 50 infra and accompanying text.
21. SEC v. F.O. Baroff Co., 497 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1974). "The late 1960's saw the collapse
of several brokerage establishments, causing serious financial losses to their clients ...
There was considerable concern that investors, particularly smaller ones, would lose confidence in the stability of broker-dealers, and withdraw from the securities markeL" Id.
at 283.

22. CCH Binder at 96,039.
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78fff(c)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii) (1970).
24. See Hearings on S. 2348, S. 3988, and S. 3989 Before the Subcomnm. on Securities of
the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Senate Hearings] (statement by SEC Chairman Budge).
25. Id. at 8-9; see 116 Cong. Rec. 39,352 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Broomfield). H.R.
Rep. No. 1613, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970) [hereinafter cited as House Report].
26. 17 C.F.R. § 240.8c-1 (1974).
27. House Report 1-3.
28. Id. See 116 Cong. Rec. 39,343 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Latta); id. at 39,346 (remarks
of Rep. Staggers) ; id. at 39,352 (remarks of Rep. Boland). Rule 15c3-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3
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Existing legislation and agency rules and regulations did not provide adequate
protection against these practices.2 9 Trust funds, established voluntarily by several national securities exchanges to aid customers of bankrupt member brokerage houses, proved insufficient. 30 SIPA was a response to the dual needs of protecting the investor and reinforcing public confidence in the market. 31 It established SIPC,3 2 an agency with authority to act for the84benefit of customer-inves33
tors of member broker-dealers in financial difficulty.
After briefly reviewing the conditions which brought the Act into being, the
Second Circuit noted in Packer Wilbur that "[t]he present case requires us to
define some of the bounds of protection afforded by SIPA and, more particularly,
to determine who its beneficiaries may be.""s It held that Coggeshall had the
(1974), issued by the SEC on Nov. 10, 1972, was intended "to provide regulatory safeguards
over customers' funds and securities held by brokers and dealers." SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 9922 (Jan. 18, 1973), reprinted in 2 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. fI 25,132, at
18,323. The rule requires broker-dealers to maintain "a reserve with respect to customer
funds and. . . to promptly obtain and thereafter maintain the physical possession or control
of fully paid and excess margin securities of customers." Id. The authority for this rule

flows from provisions in SIPA amending § 15(c)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1970). See Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 § 7(d), codified
as 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (3) (1970).
29. "While the totality of the rules and regulations ... provide important protections for
investors, it is clear that these rules are not sufficient by themselves to prevent the exposure
of customers to substantial risk of loss as a result of financial mismanagement by a firm or
its employees or insolvency." House Report 3; see 116 Cong. Rec. 39,351 (1970) (remarks
of Rep. Broyhill).
30. "Self-help efforts in the industry-such as the New York Stock Exchange Trust
Fund-were either severely strained or ineffective." SEC v. F.O. Baroff Co., 497 F.2d 280,
283 (2d Cir. 1974) ; Senate Hearings 17. See Sowards & Mofsky, The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 26 Bus. Law. 1271, 1276 (1971); Note, The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970: An Early Assessment, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 802 (1973); SIPA Federal Role,
supra note 4, at 595-604 (1971).
31. House Report 3-4.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(a) (1970).
33. SIPA provides that "SIPC shall . .. be a membership corporation the members of
which shall be .. .all persons registered as brokers or dealers under section 78o(b) of thuis
title, and ...

all persons who are members of a national securities exchange .

. . ."

15 U.S.C.

§ 78ccc(a) (2) (1970). The Act makes limited exceptions to this membership requirement,
but these are not relevant here. Id.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(a) (1) (1970); House Report 1. When notified that a subject
broker-dealer is in or is approaching financial difficulty, SIPC may apply to courts of competent jurisdiction for an adjudication that customers of the broker-dealer are in need of
the Act's protection. 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(a) (2) (1970). When such a decree Is granted, the
court must appoint a trustee, id. § 78eee(b) (3), who shall complete all open contractual
commitments of the debtor in which a customer had an interest, and who shall direct to
customers the appropriate payments, id. §§ 78fff(a), (g), from the single and separate fund,
id. § 78fff(c) (2) (B), and from the corporation fund, id. § 78ddd. The trustee shall also
manage the liquidation of the broker-dealer's business. Id. § 78fff(a) (4).
35. CCH Binder at 96,039.
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responsibility to "demonstrate that its transaction with Packer Wilbur comes
within the protection of the Act." 36
Under SIPA the trustee must give first priority to the completion of open
contractual commitments in which a customer has an interest 37 With a limited
exception, all property "received, acquired or held by or for the account of" the
debtor broker-dealer, and all property in the "single and separate fund," from
which the customers receive their pro rata share of the cash and securities owed
them, is available to complete open contractual commitments. 38 The priority
given to this function highlights a significant, though admittedly secondary,
purpose of SIPA; namely, to prevent the failure of one brokerage firm from
creating havoc in the securities industry due to the interrelationship of brokerage houses.39 It is dear that the primary purpose in completing open contractual
commitments is to insure that the customer of the debtor broker-dealer will
not suffer undue loss: the customer for whom the commitment is completed may
obtain the property involved immediately as part of his specifically identifiable
property.40 Packer Wilbur appeared to place exclusive emphasis on this goal. 41
But, by ignoring the other purpose of SIPA, to stabilize the securities market,
the court risked weakening that market by effectively causing a brokerage house
to face an undeserved financial loss of almost $ 10 0 ,0 0 0 .4As a basis for its conclusion that the Coggeshall/Packer Wilbur transaction
was not an open contractual commitment as envisioned in SIPA, the Second Circuit argued that SIPA does not protect an unscrupulous customer such as Arenstein.4 This finding appears to be one of first impression. 44 The court based its
conclusion on the arguments of the lower court, the purposes of SIPA as indicated
in legislative history, specific sections of earlier securities laws and resultant regulations, and cases interpreting those sections and regulations.
36. Id. at 96,042.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(d) (1970). For the purposes of this section a customer is any
person other than a broker or dealer. A customer has an interest in the transaction if the
broker was acting as agent for him, or if a dealer "held a customer's order which was to be
executed as part of the transaction." Id. Coggeshall claimed under the latter portion of this
section. 362 F. Supp. at 515.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(d) (1970).
39. Senate Hearings 1 (statement of Senator Williams); see note 60 infra; SEC v.
Aberdeen Sec. Co., 480 F.2d 1121, 1125-26 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1111 (1973).
40. 15. U.S.C. § 78fff(d) (1970).
41. "[T]he objective of SIPA was to protect members of the investing public, not
brokers. There was no intention to 'bail out' the securities industry." CCH Binder at
96,042 (footnote omitted).
42.

See note 69 infra.

43. CCH Binder at 96,042-43. The court does acknowledge that such a finding would not
apply to a customer who violated such a regulation through an honest mistake. Id. at
96,043 n.13.
44. "There is no indication in the legislative history that Congress ever adverted to the
possibility of a securities law violator reaping the rewards of SIPA. Congressional attention
appears to have been preempted by a concern for the misdeeds of the brokerage community."
Id. at 96,043 n.11. But see text accompanying note 52 infra.
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The district court had questioned whether the overriding goal of SIPA demands that a customer who deliberately violates the margin rules be prohibited
from recovering out of SIPC funds. 45 Noting that the recently promulgated Regulation X 40 requires investors as well as broker-dealers to observe loan requirements such as those contained in Regulation T, 4 T the district court stated that
"[t]o allow Arenstein to recover from49 SIPC would contradict the express intent
of Congress.."48 This it refused to do.
The Second Circuit followed the lower court's reasoning, arguing that the open
contractual commitment between Coggeshall and Packer Wilbur was one in which
the "essential 'customer' interest required by the Act" was absent,50 saying:
We cannot believe that Congress intended that an active and sophisticated securities
investor such as Arenstein, who deliberately engaged in a margin violation, should
5
enjoy the benefits of SIPA. '
Nowhere in the legislative history of the Act, 52 however, is there a single reference to a congressional intent to exclude any customers other than those specifically mentioned in the statute itself. Section 6(f)5 3 categorizes certain classes of
customers who may not receive the benefits of SIPA; the exclusion extends to
any customer of the debtor broker-dealer
who is a general partner, officer, or director of the debtor, the beneficial owner of
5 per centum or more of any class of equity security of the debtor .. .or limited

partner with a participation of 5 per centum or more in the net assets or net profits
of the debtor. . . .54
A customer who is a broker, dealer or bank is also ineligible unless be can first
demonstrate, by appropriate proof, 5 that his claim arose out of a transaction
45. 362 F. Supp. at 514.
46. 12 C.F.R. § 224 (1974) ; see note 10 supra.
47. 12 C.F.R. § 220.4 (1974); see note 10 supra.
48. 362 F. Supp. at 515 (emphasis added).
49. Id. The court also argued, by analogy to the bankruptcy laws, that its ruling was
based on equitable considerations. Id. at 517. This reasoning appears incorrect. See Simonson
v. Granquist, 369 U.S. 38 (1962); Keppel v. Tiffin Say. Bank, 197 U.S. 356 (1905); Tiffany
v. National Bank, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409 (1873).
50. CCH Binder at 96,042. See note 5 supra.
51. CCH Binder at 96,043 (footnote omitted).
52. S. Rep. No. 1218, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); House Report, supra note 25; Senate
Hearings, supra note 24; Hearings on H.R. 13308, H.R. 17585, H.R. 18081, H.R. 18109, and
H.R. 18458 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(f) (1970).
54. Id. § 78fff(f) (1) (C); see House Report 21.
55. "[ilt shall be established to the satisfaction of the trustee, from the books and
records of the debtor or from the books and records of a broker or dealer or bank or
otherwise .

. ..
"

that the transaction was for a customer of the broker, dealer or bank.

15 U.S.C. § 78fff(f) (1) (D).
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for his customers.56 Arenstein, a private investor, could not be excluded from
protection under SIPA on the basis of this section. Coggeshall is a brokerage
house, and to be entitled to recover under SIPA must demonstrate that its
involvement in the transaction was on behalf of its customer, Arenstein. But this
requirement is not at issue here, for the record in the case dearly indicates that
Coggeshall was acting on Arenstein's behalf and not its own.0 7 Therefore,
Coggeshall cannot be excluded from SIPA's protection simply on the basis of
section 6(f). The question remains, did Arenstein's conduct negate his broker's
status? There is nothing in the legislative history or in the Act itself to require
an affirmative response.
In some circumstances where Congress has failed to include a specific provision in a securities statute, it was clear that Congress intended the omitted
provision be supplied by another part of the act.58 Arguably, however, this is not
the general rule, and does not apply in the instant case. 9 The omission of any
reference in SIPA or its legislative history to the status of unscrupulous customers should be taken to mean that Congress intended SIPA only to stabilize
the securities market and protect the investor.00 Fraudulent practices, both by
56. Id.
57. This is dear from the record. Brief for Appellant at 2, Reply Brief for Appellant
at 9-10, SIPC v. Packer, Wilbur & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
ff 94,583 (2d Cir. May 31, 1974). However, the court suggested the possibility that Coggeshall
might try to claim protection under SIPA as a customer in its own right. CCH Binder
at 96,044 n.16. Apparently, the court believed that Coggeshall might claim customer statu
in its own right pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(f)(1)(D) (1970), if it was purchasing or
transferring the stock on Arenstein's behalf. The court itself admits that this provision at
best gives only a limited opportunity to broker-dealers to claim under SIPA. CCH Binder
at 96,044 n.16.
58. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963) (failure by Congress to insert a particularized anti-fraud provision in the Investment Advisers Act of
1940 overcome by consideration of the history and chronology of the anti-fraud securities
legislation prior to 1940; earlier anti-fraud provision deemed to be incorporated in the
1940 Act).
59. See, e.g., Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 1013 (1971) and materials discussed in note 49 supra.
60. "The Securities Act of 1933 requires that investors have adequate information to
exercise sound judgment concerning the securities he purchases [sic]. The Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 insures that he will not be victimized by fraudulent, manipulative, or deceptive
selling schemes, and that the market in which his broker transacts his order will be maintained in a fair and orderly fashion. But neither statute insures that this same investor who
exercises sound judgment in his choice of stock, and places his order with a reputable broker,
cannot lose his entire investment if that broker subsequently fails because of operational or
financial difficulties.' Senate Hearings 142 (statement by Senator Muskie). "Stock brokers
owe money to one another. The failure of one aggravates the problem and reduces the
financial soundness of all other firms to which it is indebted. Since many firms invest their
capital in securities, market declines may further aggravate brokers' financial problems and
cause stock broker failure to pyramid. This can also force a sale of brokers' securities, intensifying a general decline in securities values. A combination of these events can erode
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broker-dealers and customer-investors, are expressly subject to the regulation
and penalties set forth in previous securities regulation legislation.0 1 Had Congress intended SIPA to add an additional check against fraud, it would clearly
and unambiguously have stated that purpose.
On the contrary, Congress appears to have intended to avoid "the lengthy
delay which might otherwise result if customers had to wait until the completion
of the liquidation proceeding" 0 2 set in motion by SIPC. A critical section of
SIPA provides:
In order to provide for prompt payment and satisfaction of the net equities of
customers of debtor, SIPC shall advance to the trustee such moneys as may be required to pay or otherwise satisfy claims in full of each customer, but not to exceed
$50,000 for each customer; except that

.

.

a claim for cash

. . .

shall not exceed

$20,000....
It shall be the duty of the trustee to discharge promptly ... all obligations of the
debtor to each of its customers relating to, or net equities based upon, securities or
cash by the delivery of securities or the effecting of payments to such customer ....08

SIPA appears to enable a customer-investor-innocent or not-to avoid
going into debt or filing for bankruptcy simply because of the financial collapse

of the brokerage house with which he dealt. There are no express provisions in
SIPA for withholding funds from a customer who is otherwise entitled to such
funds under SIPA. In contrast, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act,0 on which
the theory of SIPA was based, in principle at least,0 5 provides that:

investor confidence and cause securities values to plummet. One of the features of this Insurance program is to guard against such a situation by protecting brokers from each others'
failures." Id. at 142-43.
In the House debate on SIPA, several Congressmen noted that the Act does not provide
sanctions-criminal or otherwise-against violations of the securities laws. See, e.g., 116
Cong. Rec. 39,353 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Rarick) ; id. at 39,360 (remarks of Rep. Gross and
Rep. Moss). In SIPA "Congress has departed from its traditional policy of preventive
protection." SIPA Federal Role, supra note 4, at 612.
61. 3 J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 70.04 (4th ed. 1974): "The
general purpose of the statutes controlling the sale of securities is to prevent fraudulent
sales of worthless securities to the purchasing public." Id. Customers and investors, as well
as brokers, are subject to the anti-fraud statutes. A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393,
396 (2d Cir. 1967). The anti-fraud securities acts are the following: Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970); Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh
(1970); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1970);
Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1970); Investment Company Act
of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1970); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1970).
62. 116 Cong. Rec. 39,353 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Anderson); id. at 39,344 (remarks
of Rep. Latta); see House Report 22; SIPA Federal Role 612.
63. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78fff(f), (g)(1970) (emphasis added).
64. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-31 (1970).
65. House Report 2; Senate Hearings 2 (statement of Senator Williams); Id. at 142
(statement of Senator Muskie); 116 Cong. Rec. 39,347 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Springer).
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The Corporation may withhold payment of such portion of the insured deposit of
any depositor in a closed bank as may be required to provide for the payment of any
liability of such depositor . . . to the dosed bank or its receiver . . . pending the
determination and payment of such liability by such depositor or any other person
liable therefor. 66

Absent an express provision in SIPA permitting or requiring the trustee to
withhold funds until the customer's liabilities are determined, it is difficult to
justify a judicial decision mandating such a withholding.
The difficulty with the court's decision is further evidenced by the abundance

of remedies available in the anti-fraud securities legislation noted above. 6 All
of those acts give the SEC broad discretionary power to investigate suspected
violations of any act, rule or regulation. Its powers include the right to request
injunctions and the right to report violations to the Attorney General for
68
criminal prosecution.
Because of the multiplicity of explicit remedies and penalities in these acts,
the absence of such provisions in SIPA becomes all the more significant. The
Second Circuit refused to enforce SIPA in a situation in which SIPA itself
does not forbid enforcement. In so doing the court implicitly imposed a penalty
on Coggeshall and an undeserved benefit on Packer Wilbur's other customers00
It should be noted, however, that there are significant differences between FDIC and SIPC.
For example, before joining FDIC, banks must submit to a rigorous examination; for all
practical purposes, membership in SIPC is automatic for all broker-dealers and members
of national stock exchanges. 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(a) (2) (1970). Also, the securities industry
exercises a greater amount of self-regulation than permitted in the banking industry. See
generally Senate Hearings 212-13, 252-55; House Hearings 221, 367, 375-76; 116 Cong. Rec.
39,348 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Celler); SIPA Federal Role 607.
66.

12 U.S.C. § 1822(d) (1970).

67. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
68. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(a), (b), 78u(e), 79r(a), (f), S0a-41(e), 80b-9(e) (1970). See also id.
§§ 77v(b), 77x, 77uuu(a), (b), 77yyy, 78u(a), (b), 78ff(a), 79r(d), 79z-3, 80a-41(a), (c),
80a-48, 80b-9(a), (c), 80b-17 (1970); Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933,
43 Yale L.J. 171, 173-78, 181-82 (1933); Herlands, Criminal Law Aspects of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 21 Va. L. Rev. 139 (1934); Kline, Enforcement Work of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 4 Fed. B. Ass'n J. 117 (1940); Note, Commingled Civil
and Criminal Proceedings: A Peek at Constitutional Limitations and a Poke at the SEC,
34 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 527 (1966); Note, Penal and Injunctive Provisions of the Securities
Act, 23 Wash. U.L.Q. 251 (1938).
69. The practical results of the decisions by the district court and the Second Circuit are
as follows: (1) Arenstein, who did not put up any money at any time during the transaction,
has no right to the 2,000 shares of stock, has no right to the $90,933.82 which he claimed
from Packer Wilbur, and owes $90,933.82 to Coggeshall. If he is forced to pay this sum in a
civil action he will receive no stock in return, since the stocks for which he would be
paying had been sold by the subsequently liquidated Packer Wilbur to a good faith purchaser. Arenstein's only possible recourse would be to sue the liquidated Packer Wilbur for
the price of the stock which the latter sold. Any such suit would be stayed until the completion of the liquidation proceedings. 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(b) (2) (1970). (2) Coggeshall has
no right to either the stock or the money, and is in fact out $90,933.82. Its only possible
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70
The court suggested several other remedies for Coggeshall, indicating that at
least one of the proposed alternatives would eventually enable the brokerage
house to recoup its loss. Despite these suggestions, however, the goal of SIPA
to maintain a balanced market during the crisis period of a broker-dealer
failure remained unfulfilled.
To strengthen its position that the unscrupulous Arenstein was not a cus71
tomer as defined by SIPA, the Second Circuit cited A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow.
This case held that the Exchange Act and rule 10b-5 were intended to prevent
"in the
fraud from all sources. Both investor and broker-dealer are bound,
72
public interest," to avoid "manipulative and deceptive" practices. The Packer
Wilbur court observed that Arenstein's fraudulent conduct placed him "squarely
73
within the proscription" of rule 10b-5. However, the court immediately moved
as a deliberate violator to a conclusion
Arenstein
beyond its characterization of
to such an individual would be a
SIPA
under
assistance
"[p]roviding
that
' 74 In so doing it failed to make
gratuitous, indeed counter-productive, gesture.
an important distinction between the instant case and Perlow. The latter involved a civil suit 15 to recover damages resulting from the fraud of a customer.

remedies are to sue Arenstein in a civil suit (a prolonged procedure) or to submit a claim
as a customer in its own right against the single and separate fund of the trustee of Packer
Wilbur (a tenuous procedure, since the 1970 Act is not primarily geared to benefit brokerdealers as customers in their own right. See Senate Hearings 253). CCH Binder at 96,044;
15 U.S.C. §§ 78fff(c)(2)(A)&(B) (1970). (3) Packer Wilbur, whose conduct in sending two
bad checks to Coggeshall caused the immediate problem and whose poor management caused
it to encounter the financial difficulty which led to its liquidation, has $94,203.10 from the
sale of 2,000 shares of stock which it received from Coggeshall. This "windfall" will be disbursed "pro rata" from the single and separate fund to Packer Wilbur's other customers,
who are the ultimate, though undeserving, beneficiaries of the decision in the Instant case.
15 U.S.C. § 78fff(c) (2)(B) (1970).
70. See note 57 supra. Even if Arenstein were to bring an action against the trustee,
the latter might assert advantageously a defense under § 29(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1970), which states in pertinent part: "Every contract
made in violation of any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, and
every contract . . . the performance of which involves the violation of . . . any provision

of this chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder, shall be void . . .as regards the rights
of any person who, in violation of any such provision, rule, or regulation, shall have made
or engaged in the performance of any such contract .

. . ."

This section has been interpreted

to give an innocent party the right to rescind or affirm such a contract. Goldman v. Bank of
Commonwealth, 332 F. Supp. 699 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd, 467 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1972).
If the trustee were successful in such a defense, Arenstein would be relegated to the position
of an unsecured general creditor.
71. 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).
72. Id. at 396.
73. CCH Binder at 96,043.
74. Id.
75. Although not expressly provided in the statute or the agency promulgations, the
courts have construed an implied private cause of action for violations of the securities laws.
E.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp.,
311 U.S. 282 (1940); Junger v. Hertz, Neumark & Warner, 426 F.2d 805 (2d Cir.), cert.
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The only statutes with which the court had to deal were the securities laws
which had been enacted to prevent fraud. 70 The Perlow court implicitly acknowledged this, citing the Supreme Court in SEC v. Capital Gains Research
77
Bureau, Inc.:
Congress intended the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to be construed like other
securities legislation "enacted for the purpose of avoiding 78frauds," not technically and
restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes.
Packer Wilbur, on the other hand, involved a proceeding established by a
securities law enacted for the purpose of providing reimbursement for investors
so as to "restore confidence in and strengthen the operation of the securities
market. '7 9 The Packer Wilbur court apparently did not observe that the
standard of flexibility lauded by the Supreme Court was intended to be limited,
and was in fact so limited by the court in Perlozw, to anti-fraud securities legislation.80 There is no indication in SIPA or its legislative history that Congress
intended the courts to interpret the Act as broadly or as flexibly as they interpret the regulatory securities acts. Moreover, Coggeshall, under the facts,
was blameless.
In another part of the Perlow opinion the court noted, "the practices allegedly
employed by the Perlows will, if allowed to continue, exacerbate the very evils
that the securities laws were designed to prevent." 8' For this reason, inter alia,
the Perlow court held that rule l0b-5 prohibited conduct such as the Perlows
were engaged in.82 On the other hand, SIPA was enacted principally as an
denied, 400 U.S. 880 (1970); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
389 US. 970 (1967) ; Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Fischman v. Raytheon
Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951). Brokers may also sue in a private action against violating investors. A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).
76. See note 61 supra.
77. 375 U.S. 180 (1963). In this case, one of the respondents, an investment advisory
company which published monthly reports to subscribers regarding stocks for purchase and
investment, was found to have established a pattern of purchasing stock shortly before
recommending it in their report. When the stock's value rose within a few days of the
recommendation (probably due to heavy buying stimulated by the recommendation),
respondent immediately sold for a profit. Despite the absence of any evidence that respondent
intended to injure anyone, or that anyone was in fact injured, the Court held such conduct
to constitute fraud under Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 206, 15 U-S.C. § 80b-6 (1970).
375 U.S. at 195.
78. 375 US. at 195 (footnote omitted).
79. CCH Binder at 96,043.
80. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
81. 375 F.2d at 397.
82. Id. Plaintiff had alleged that the Perlows had ordered the purchase of stock intending
not to pay if, on the day set for payment, the value of the stock had decreased. Id. at 395.
In fact, the Perlows did not make payment. Noting the potentially manipulative effect on
the securities market-by generating an artificial demand for that stock--the court held the
complaint to state a cause of action under section 10(b) and rule lOb-S. Id. at 397; see
1967 Duke L.J. 894. In Packer Wilbur, however, there was no allegation that Arenstein
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insurance law; it was not designed to prevent the fraudulent activity in which
Arenstein was involved. SIPA does not empower the trustee to prevent fraud by
such customers, and in fact limits the trustee to specific statutory functions.A
In Packer Wilbur the court distinguished another recent Second Circuit
case, Pearlstein v. Scudder & German,84 which allowed "an investor who benefits from a margin violation to sue his broker for [the broker's] part in that same
violation. '8 5 The Pearlsteincourt explained its decision:
In our view the danger of permitting a windfall to an unscrupulous investor is outweighed by the salutary policing effect which the threat of private suits for compensatory damages can have upon brokers and dealers above and beyond the threats of
governmental action by the Securities and Exchange Commission.80
The Packer Wilbur court argued that no such rationale exists for justifying a
payment from a fund established to strengthen the securities market to one
"whose fraudulent activities have tended to weaken the market." 87 The court
appears correct in distinguishing Pearlstein, since it is not nearly on point.
Pearlstein involved the intricate and perplexing issue of an implied right of
private civil action under the securities acts, 88 while the instant case involved
statutory interpretation and the relation of SIPA to other securities acts.
The court stated a second reason why Coggeshall could not require completion of the open contractual commitment under section 6(d). Such commitments, the court found, must be wholly executory, for Congress intended their
completion to result merely in a net flow 89 of cash or securities from or to the
debtor broker-dealer. Only totally unexecuted contracts would result in such
a net flow; to complete partially executed contracts, the court believed, would
open the debtor to unlimited obligations and grant an extraordinary preference
to certain parties. The court argued: "There is nothing to indicate that the
framers of the legislation intended to bestow on certain customers of a brokerage
house such an extraordinary preference. On the contrary, the legislative history
reveals a clear intent to restrict the outflow from the estate."90
However, the Second Circuit appears to have erroneously interpreted the
intended to pay only if the stock increased in value, but not to pay at all if it declined. CCH
Binder at 96,040.
83. 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(b) (1970). See also SEC v. Alan F. Hughes, Inc., 481 F.2d 401
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1092 (1973), wherein the court appeared to limit the power

of the trustee strictly to the statutory grant.
84. 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971), noted in 39 Fordham L. Rev. 782 (1971).
85. CCH Binder at 96,043.
86. 429 F.2d at 1141 (footnote omitted).
87. CCH Binder at 96,043.
88. See note 75 supra. It also preceded enactment of Regulation X. See Comment, supra
note 10.
89. "Net flow", as used by the court, appears to mean generally the benefit of the bargain; i.e., the difference in price of the shares on the purchase day and the date of filing by
the SIPC.
90. CCH Binder at 96,044 (referring to House Hearings, supra note 52, at 227).
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intent of section 6(d). There is no language in the legislation or its history"' to
indicate that an open contractual commitment must be totally unperformed
by either party. Furthermore, the court's argument regarding net outflow will,
upon analysis, lead to a conclusion opposite from its own. A net flow in the
transaction between Coggeshall and Packer Wilbur can be achieved only by
completion of the transaction. Packer Wilbur received shares worth $90,933.82
from Coggeshall. From a bona fide purchaser Packer Wilbur received $94,203.10
in cash, $90,933.82 of which it owed to Coggeshall. In arguing that such payment by the trustee would, under SIPA, be an unconscionable outflow,0 2 the
court appeared to be untroubled by the fact that the trustee's refusal to pay the
sum was an equally unjustified inflow to Packer Wilbur.
A careful study of the statutory language indicates that Coggeshall dearly
was in that class of persons entitled to the completion of their transactions.03
The Coggeshall/Packer Wilbur transaction satisfied all six elements required
by section 6(d): The transaction was a contractual commitment, a bilateral
agreement between the two parties. It was a transaction in securities, and was
made in the ordinary course of Packer Wilbur's business. Significantly, the
obligation was outstanding on the filing date. 4 Arenstein, the customer, had an
interest in the transaction, 95 and the SEC had issued no rule or regulation
determining that completion of such commitments was not in the public
interest.9
The Second Circuit's decision in Packer Wilbur might be seen as a natural
and logical extension of equitable principles.9 7 It is tenable to argue that an
intentional violator of the securities laws who put no fund into the entire
transaction should be denied relief in the courts, as well as excluded from a
quasi-public fund. Since he comes into court with unclean hands, the court
will leave him to his self-made dilemma. 8 While such argument night be
91. See note 52 supra.
92. See text accompanying note 97 supra.
93. 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(d) (1970).
94. The checks issued by Packer Wilbur were negotiable instruments. Uniform Commercial Code § 3-802 (1962 version) states: "Unless otherwise agreed where an instrument is
taken for an underlying obligation . . . the obligation is suspended pro tanto . . . if it is
payable on demand until its presentment. If the instrument is dishonored action may be
maintained either on the instrument or the obligation . . . Y When Coggeshall presented
the checks for payment and they were dishonored, Packer Wilbur's previously suspended
obligation was revived, and remained outstanding on the day the SIPC trustee was appointed.
95. See notes 50 to 88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the validity of Arenstein's interest and his status as customer.
96. In 1973 the SEC announced a rule which limits the net cash flow in the completion
of open contractual commitments to $20,000. SEC Securities Investor Protection Act of
1970 Release No. 5 (July 25, 1973). See SIPC v. Packer, Wilbur & Co., CCH Binder at
96,044 n.15.
97. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
98. See CCH Binder at 96,041; see also Brief for Appellant, Brief for Respondent (Joint
Appendix) at 18, SIPC v. Packer, Wilbur & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. ff 94,583 (2d Cir. May 31, 1974).
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valid against Arenstein, however, it lacks merit when applied to Coggeshall,
who acted in good faith and in compliance with the margin rules."' In the
instant case it was Coggeshall, not Arenstein, who sought the funds from SIPC.
Despite the court's persuasiveness, then, the decision in Packer Wilbur fails
for one principal reason: the result is precisely what Congress, in enacting
SIPA, appeared most anxious to avoid; namely, that when a broker-dealer
collapses financially, customers and other broker-dealers are severely handicapped and often face the risk of their own financial ruin. SIPA was a narrowly
constructed response designed to prevent this type of chain reaction bankruptcy.
It attempts to provide a speedy method of liquidating the debtor broker-dealer
with a minimum of disruption or uncertainty for customers and other brokerdealers. 100 If the court had permitted the completion of the open contractual
commitment, Coggeshall, who by the court's own reasoning acted in good faith
throughout the transaction,' 0' would have received the money it expended
while acting on Arenstein's behalf. 10 2 Although this result would have released Arenstein from his debt to Coggeshall, 103 he would still be liable for
his fraudulent conduct and his violation of the margin rules. 104 He would remain responsible for his actions, and at the same time the principal goal of
SIPA would be furthered. The court ignored that principal purpose and based
its decision on a broader, less specific purpose of the Act to maintain an honest
and reputable securities industry. 05 The result is that the latter, less fundamental purpose is permitted to supercede the primary purpose of SIPA.100
Joseph B. Valentine
Welfare Rights-Aid For Dependent Children-State Can Reduce
Benefits on the Basis of the Mother's Living Arrangements.-Plaintiff Hurley, a woman with three dependent children, had been receiving $150 per month
under the Aid For Dependent Children program,' until an unrelated male friend
moved in with her. The man was under no duty to support either Mrs. Hurley
or her children, and in fact did not contribute to their support. Nevertheless,
Mrs. Hurley's shelter allowance was reduced by $35 per month for the four
months that her friend remained in her home. On Hurley's motion for summary
judgment, the district court voided the relevant state welfare regulation on
supremacy clause grounds. 2
99. See note 101 infra.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78fff(d), (f), (g) (1970).
CCH Binder at 96,041-42.
See notes 5 and 69 supra and accompanying text.
103. SIPC v. Packer, Wilbur & Co., CCH Binder at 96,040 n.4.
104. See notes 10, 11 & 74 supra and accompanying text.
105. 116 Cong. Rec. 39350 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Keith).
106. See Moscarelli v. Staumm, 288 F. Supp. 453, 459 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
100.
101.
102.

1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq. (1970).
2. Hurley v. Van Lare, 365 F. Supp. 186 (S.D.N.Y 1973), rev'd and remanded sub nom.
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Plaintiff Taylor lived with her dependent daughter and disabled sister. The
Taylors' rent was $180 per month, toward which the disabled sister had no duty
to contribute and in fact did not contribute. While the disabled sister was receiving home relief, the family received the maximum shelter allowance. But
when the sister became ineligible for home relief, the shelter payments were
reduced to $110 per month. As a result, plaintiff Taylor could not meet her rent
payments and received an eviction notice. The district court voided the state
3
regulation requiring the shelter payment reductions.
Mrs. Otey lived with her thirteen year old son. When her twenty-three year
old son, who was unemployed and ineligible for assistance, moved in, the
family's grant was reduced from $145 per month to $96.65. Again the district
court voided the relevant state regulation. 4
On consolidated appeals, the Second Circuit reversed the district courts and
sustained against supremacy clause attack the regulations that required the reductions in the plaintiffs' benefits. Taylor v. Lavine, 497 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1974).
The primary purpose of the Aid For Dependent Children program is to aid
needy dependent children within the home.5 It was established in 19350 in
response to the depression concern that each family be supported by a "breadwinner." 7 The initial question, of course, is who is a needy dependent child. The
simple statutory answer is that a needy child is anyone who has been deprived of
8
parental support by reason of death, continued absence or disability of a parent.
But the real answer is far from simple, being determined-and complicated-by
the "cooperative federalism ' 9 under which the Aid For Dependent Children program operates.
Taylor v. Lavine, 497 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1974). Hurley challenged 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 352.31(a)
(3) (iv) (1973) which provides that "[wihen the man [living with a female applicant or
recipient to whom he is not married] is unwilling to assume responsibility for the woman
or her children, and there are no children of which he is the acknowledged or adjudicated
father, he shall be treated as a lodger in accordance with section 352.30(d)." Hurley also
challenged id. § 352.30(d) (1973) which provides in part: "A non-legally responsible relative
or unrelated person in the household, who is not applying for nor receiving public assistance
shall not be included in the budget and shall be deemed to be a lodger.
...
. In the event
a lodger does not contribute at least $15 per month, the family's shelter allowance . . .
shall be a pro rata share of the regular shelter allowance."
3. Taylor v. Lavine, No. 73-699 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 1973), rev'd, 497 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir.
1974).
4. Id.
5. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 325 (1968) ; Doe v. Gillman, 479 F.2d 646, 648 (8th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 3073 (1974); Rosen v. Hursh, 464 F.2d 731 (8th Cir. 1972);
Mothers & Childrens Rights Org. v. Stanton, 371 F. Supp. 298, 303 (N.D. Ind. 1973);
Jenkins v. Georges, 312 F. Supp. 289, 292 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
6. Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, Title IV, § 401, 49 Stat. 627 (codified at 42 U.S.C.

§ 601 (1970)).
7. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 327-30 (1968) ; see Lurie, Major Changes in the Structure
of the AFDC Program Since 1935, 59 Cornell L. Rev. 825, 826-27 (1974).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970).
9. "The AFDC program is based on a scheme of cooperative federalism .... States are
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King v. Smith held that while states have wide discretion in determining
eligibility requirements measuring need, they are not permitted to impose additional eligibility requirements unrelated to need." In King, Alabama sought to
circumvent the federal definition of a needy child as one deprived of parental
support, by redefining "parent" to include a man who has frequent sexual encounters with the needy child's mother. 2 Thus, in every case where an AFDC
mother had a male companion Alabama concluded that a parent was present, and
therefore, the child, by definition, was not needy.18 Alabama asserted two state
interests in defense of its plan: it sought to deter immorality and illegitimacy,
and to prevent unmarried cohabiting couples from obtaining benefits unavailable
to married couples.' 4 As to the first interest, the United States Supreme Court
held that, though immorality and illegitimacy are valid state concerns,' 8 a state
not required to participate in the program, but those which desire to take advantage of the
substantial federal funds available . . . are required to submit an AFDC plan . . . . Thb
plan must conform with several requirements of the Sodal Security Act and with rules and
regulations promulgated by HEW." King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316-17 (1968).
10. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
11. The Court construed 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (1970) which provides: "(Ald to
families with dependent children shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible
individuals ... ." 392 U.S. at 316-27; see Comment, AFDC Eligibility Requirements Unrelated
to Need: The Impact of King v. Smith, 118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1219, 1228-29 (1970). For a
discussion of the distinction between eligibility requirements based on need and eligibility
requirements unrelated to need see id. at 1241. The courts have made this distinction consistently. Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972) (states may not restrict federal definition of dependent child to exclude children whose fathers are continually absent in Vietnam);
Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971) (state effort to exclude college students frdm
eligibility invalidated); Doe v. Gillman, 479 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S.
Ct. 3073 (1974) (voiding Iowa statute requiring mother to cooperate with state In legal
actions against those responsible for child's support); Doe v. Ellis, 350 F. Supp. 375
(D.S.C. 1972) (state cannot deny benefits to mothers who refuse to identify putative fathers
of their illegitimate children); Saddler v. Winstead, 332 F. Supp. 130 (N.D. Miss. 1971)
(invalidating state regulation requiring that custodian of child must give name and address
of parents who deserted the child and otherwise assist state in locating parents); X v.
McCorkle, 333 F. Supp. 1109 (D.N.J. 1970), modified on other grounds sub nom. Engleman
v. Amos, 404 U.S. 23 (1971) (per curiam) (struck down state attempt to eliminate Income
tax exemptions from determination of available adjusted income for AFDC eligibility purposes); Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969), appeal dismissed for failure to
docket, 396 U.S. 488 (1970) (termination of benefits unless mother reveals name of father
of illegitimate children; held invalid). But cf. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 544-45
(1972) (§ 602(a) (10) concerned only with time element and elimination of waiting lists);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 481 n.12 (1970) (dictum) (suggestion that § 602(a)(10)
may have been intended only as a ban on waiting lines).
12. 392 U.S. at 313-14.
13. Id. at 314, 317-18.
14. Id. at 318.
15. "We . . . emphasize that no legitimate interest of the State of Alabama Is defeated
by the decision we announce today. The State's interest in discouraging illicit sexual behavior
and illegitimacy may be protected by other means ... including state participation in AFDC
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may not deal with them by depriving children of AFDC benefits to which they
16
would otherwise be entitled.
For the same reason, the Court rejected Alabama's second interest of preventing cohabitors from obtaining benefits foreclosed to married couples. 17 The
Court reasoned that an unmarried male companion, unlike a parent, is not obligated to support his mistress or her child.' 8 The Court declared that Congress
intended the term "parent" to encompass persons under a legal duty to support
the child. 19 A "substitute father," the Court concluded, is under no such duty.20
Following the King decision, HEW promulgated the "man-in-the-house" regulation to deter further state efforts to reduce AFDC benefits in disregard of
the actual resources and actual need of families. The HEW regulation provided
that the presence in the home of a "substitute parent" or other nonlegally obligated individual does not permit a presumption that income is available to a
child. 21 The HEW regulation supplemented existing regulations declaring that
only income actually available to the recipient could be included in the com22
putation of AFDC benefits.
rehabilitative programs. Its interest in economically allocating its limited AFDC resources
may be protected by its undisputed power to set the level of benefits and the standard of
need, and by its taking into account in determining whether a child is needy all actual and
regular contributions to his support." Id. at 333-34.
16. The Court was at pains to emphasize that Alabama's regulation contravened the
basic purpose of the program it sought to supplement. "[I]t is simply inconceivable ...
that Alabama is free to discourage immorality and illegitimacy by the device of absolute
disqualification of needy children.... [T~he method it has chosen plainly conflicts with the
Act." Id. at 326-27 (footnote omitted); see Comment, AFDC Eligibility Requirements Unrelated to Need: The Impact of King v. Smith, 118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1219, 1226-27 (1970).
17. 392 US. at 329.
18. An exhaustive analysis of legislative history convinced the Court in King that Congress
intended "parent" to mean only those persons legally obligated to support the child. Id.
at 327-33.
19. Id. at 329.
20. Id.
21. "[Tlhe determination whether a child has been deprived of parental support or care
by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity
of a parent ... will be made only in relation to the child's natural or adoptive parent, or
in relation to the child's stepparent who is ceremonially married to the child's natural or
adoptive parent and is legally obligated to support the child under State law of general
applicability ....
Under this requirement, the inclusion in the family, or the presence in
the home, of a 'substitute parent' or 'man-in-the-house' or any individual other than one
described in this paragraph is not an acceptable basis for a finding of ineligibility or for
assuming availability of income by the State. In establishing financial eligibility and the
amount of the assistance payment, only such net income as is actually available for current
use on a regular basis will be considered, and the income only of the parent . . . will be
considered available for children in the household in the absence of proof of actual contributions." 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a) (1973) (formerly 45 C.F.R. § 203.1 (1971)).
22. "[Olnly such net income as is actually available for current use on a regular basis
will be considered . . . and (d) income and resources will be reasonably evaluated." Id.
§§ 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(c)-(d) (1973).
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The HEW regulations were sustained in Lewis v. Martin.23 The United States
Supreme Court, relying on King and the federal "man-in-the-house" regulation, 24
invalidated a California statute and regulations conclusively presuming that the
income of a nonadoptive stepfather or a man assuming the role of spouse was
available to the children 5 Moreover, as other cases have recognized, such a
conclusive presumption of support undermines the objectives of the AFDC program.26 If relatives who cannot afford to care for a child have their benefits
reduced on the assumption that additional income is available, they may be less
inclined to shelter the child. 27 State legislatures do not view AFDC from the
perspective of the Supreme Court, however, for they focus upon a wholly different administrative problem: how to police a system that lends itself to dishonesty.26 To curtail dishonesty, many states29legislate presumptions. Such presumptions rarely are sustained by the courts.
23. 397 U.S. 552, 554 (1970).
24. "Our decision in King v. Smith held only that a legal obligation to support was a
necessary condition for qualification as a 'parent'; it did not also suggest that it would always
be a sufficient condition. We find nothing in [the man-in-the-house] regulation to suggest
inconsistency with the Act's basic purpose of providing aid to 'needy' children, except where
there is a 'breadwinner' in the house who can be expected to provide such aid himself ....
In the absence of proof of actual contribution, California may not consider the child's
'resources' to include either the income of a nonadopting stepfather who is not legally obligated to support the child. . . or the income of a (man assuming the role of a spouse]-whatever the nature of his obligation to support." Id. at 559-60 (italics deleted).
25. Id. at 560.
26. "The AFDC provisions ... envision aid to strengthen the entire family unit, including
the dependent child's parent, so as to encourage the care of the child within his own home.
See 42 U.S.C. § 601. A procedure which directly or indirectly lessens the benefits flowing
to the dependent child should not be approved." Doe v. Gillman, 479 F.2d 646, 648 (8th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 3073 (1974).
27. "The purpose of ... AFDC is to encourage '[tihe care of dependent children in their
own homes or in the homes of relatives . ..

.'

42 U.S.C. § 601. By reducing payments to

children living with non-legally responsible adults, the Pennsylvania regulations have the
effect of discouraging such adults from caring for dependent children; they make it more
difficult for the 'substitute parent' to maintain the child's family unit." Jenkins v. Georges,
312 F. Supp. 289, 292 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
28. See generally Lurie, Major Changes in the Structure of the AFDC Program Since
1935, 59 Cornell L. Rev. 825, 855-57 (1974); Note, AFDC Income Attribution: The Man-inthe-House And Welfare Grant Reductions, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1370, 1372-76 (1970) ; Comment,
AFDC Eligibility Requirements Unrelated to Need: The Impact of King v. Smith, 118 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1219, 1242-50 (1970).
29. Shea v. Vialpando, 94 S. Ct. 1746 (1974) (standardized maximum deduction for employment expenses invalid if no provision for proving actual expenses above the standard
deduction) ; Rodriguez v. Vowell, 472 F.2d 622 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 944 (1973)
(invalid to conclusively presume child's income used only for himself); Reyna v. Vowell,
470 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1972) (invalid to presume that income of child is available to family) ;
Rosen v. Hursh, 464 F.2d 731 (8th Cir. 1972) (invalid to presume that stepfather's income
is contributed to child's support); Mothers & Childrens Rights Org. v. Stanton, 371 F.
Supp. 298 (N.D. Ind. 1973) (unlawful to conclusively presume that AFDC recipient receives
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In Owens v. Parham, a three judge district court struck down a presumption
nearly identical 31 to that involved in Taylor. Georgia's method of computing
shelter allowances under the Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled program
(AABD) 32 was based on the number of persons in the household. As the number
of persons in the house increased, the allowance decreased. Since, as applied,
there was no opportunity for the AABD recipient to rebut the presumption33
that each member of the household sustained his pro rata share of housing
expense, the court ruled that this method of computation denied the recipient
34
due process of law.
Owens was followed in Hausman v. Department of Institutions and Agencies. 5
In Hausman, the New Jersey Supreme Court invalidated a state regulation requiring a per capita reduction in the AFDC recipient's level of need when in3
eligible individuals reside in the household. 0
pro rata contribution from non-recipient living with him); Owens v. Parham, 350 F. Supp.
598 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (irrebuttable presumption that non-eligible persons living with recipients
contribute pro rata share of expenses and that recipients' need can be reduced accordingly
held invalid); Boucher v. Minter, 349 F. Supp. 1240 (D. lass. 1972) (conclusive presumption
that stepfather supports stepchildren invalidated); Gaither v. Sterrett, 346 F. Supp. 1095
(N.D. Ind.), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 1070 (1972) (state attempt to hold stepfathers liable for
stepchildren's support invalidated as not a law of general applicability); Gilliard v. Craig,
331 F. Supp. 587 (W.D.N.C. 1971), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 807 (1972) (assets of individual
are not to be presumed available to whole family); Doe v. Schmidt, 330 F. Supp. 159 (E.D.
Wis. 1971) (invalid to conclusively presume presence of spouse unless divorce proceedings
filed); Jenkins v. Georges, 312 F. Supp. 289 (W.D. Pa. 1969) (invalid to conclusively presume
contribution by non-legally responsible adult living with AFDC family); Hausman v.
Department of Insts. & Agcys., 64 N.J. 202, 314 A.2d 362, cert. denied, 94 S. CL 3083
(1974) (per capita reduction in recipient's level of need when ineligible individuals reside
in household violates due process if it cannot be rebutted) ; Battle v. Lavine, 44 App. Div.
2d 307, 354 N.Y.S.2d 680 (2d Dep't 1974), appeal docketed, No. -, CL App. July 2, 1974
(invalid to presume that AFDC recipient's level of need is no greater than a pro rata share
of the expenses of the non-AFDC family with whom he resides); Uhrovick v. Lavine, 43
App. Div. 2d 481, 352 N.Y.S.2d 529 (3d Dep't 1974) (invalid to presume that stepfather's
income is contributed to child's support); Slochowsky v. Lavine, 73 Misc. 2d 563, 342
N.Y.S2d 525 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (same).
30. 350 F. Supp. 598 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
31. But see the Taylor court's attempt to distinguish these presumptions at text accompanying notes 55 & 56 infra.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1382 (1970).
33. The presumption actually was invalid on the facts of the case. Plaintiff was disabled
and lived with two sons, aged 19 and 20, who were unemployed and in school Neither son
was eligible for AFDC or AABD benefits, and neither contributed to plaintiffs housing expense. Plaintiff's aid was reduced from $91 to $69 monthly when the basis of computation
shifted from the number of eligible individuals in the household to the number of inhabitants
in the household. 350 F. Supp. at 601.
34. The court held that the statute presented a valid rebuttable presumption on its face,
but as plaintiff had no opportunity for rebuttal, it was unconstitutional as applied. Id. at
604-05.
35. 64 N.J. 202, 314 A.2d 362, cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 3083 (1974).
36. The presumption was irrebuttable in its operation. Plaintiff was receiving $214 per
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The real thesis behind lowered benefits when the household comprises eligibles and
non-eligibles, as the [State] concedes . . . is in effect an irrebuttable presumption

that the non-eligibles are paying their share of the total household expenses (as distinguished from contributing to the recipients' share) .... The United States Supreme
Court has long since held, in King ...

and Lewis

. .

. that a state may not

. . .

con-

clusively presume that a "man in the house" or other non-eligible member of the
household is bearing his share of the household expenses or contributing to the living
costs of the welfare recipients so as to permit the reduction of benefits to them.87
Battle v. Lavine38 invalidated a New York regulation 9 which conclusively
presumed that when a recipient lives with non-legally responsible relatives or
friends, the recipient's housing cost is no greater than a pro rata share of the
total cost of housing to the family or friends with whom he is living.40 The majority in Battle evaluated the New York regulation in light of the federal "manin-the-house" regulation 4' which makes it invalid to presume that an ineligible
person living with a family eligible for assistance contributes to the family's
support. The issue in Battle, however, was not whether a man was living with
the recipient and contributing to her support, but whether the recipient was
living with friends and thus was not liable for full rent expense. By invalidating
this regulation, the Battle court impliedly held that a conclusive presumption of
level of need is no more valid than a conclusive presumption of support. 4 2
Furthermore, in invalidating the presumption of need, the Battle court also
rejected the state interests put forth in support of the presumption. The court
cited the soon to be reversed Hurley v. Van Lare43 for the proposition that there
is no valid state interest in preventing assistance from inuring to ineligible persons living with eligible recipients. 44 The Hurley court had reasoned that
Despite the defendants' professed concern that ineligibles not receive a rental stipend,
month for herself and her child. When her male companion moved in, her allowance was
decreased to $188, despite the fact that he did not contribute to her support. Id. at 205-06,
314 A.2d at 364.
37. Id. at 208, 314 A.2d at 365-66; accord, Mothers & Childrens Rights Org. v. Stanton,
371 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ind. 1973) (rejected claim that states have absolute discretion In
determining standard of need).
38. 44 App. Div. 2d 307, 354 N.Y.S.2d 680 (2d Dep't 1974), appeal docketed, No.
Ct. App., July 2, 1974.
39. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 352.3(c) (1973) which provides: "For children or adults in receipt of
public assistance residing with a self-maintaining non-legally responsible relative or friend ...
the allowance for rent . . . shall be computed on a prorated basis .. .
40. 44 App. Div. 2d at 309, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 682.
41. See note 21 supra.
42. 44 App. Div. 2d at 310, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 683. The concurring opinion did not reach
the constitutional question, but argued that the regulation was inapplicable to plaintiff's case
and that it was furthermore unreasonable to terminate her assistance because of the landlord's failure to cooperate. Id. at 310-11, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 684-85 (Christ, J., concurring In
part).
43. 365 F. Supp. 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), consolidated and rev'd on appeal, sub nom.
Taylor v. Lavine, 497 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1974).
44. 44 App. Div. 2d at 310, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 683.
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the inevitable result of these
regulations is to reduce, perhaps drastically, the stipend
45
for those who are eligible.
Hurley invalidated the New York regulations in question because it concluded
that
a pro rata reduction does indeed assume that the male lodger will pay his own way,
whether or not he actually does. That is precisely the assumption found impermissible
in King and Lewis. 40
The Second Circuit in Taylor v. Lavine47 reversed Hurley and held that New
York could reduce shelter allowances when lodgers resided with the welfare
recipients. The court distinguished King. In King, the state's definition of
"parent" resulted in rendering ineligible for benefits an otherwise eligible child. 8
The Taylor court reasoned that New York's "lodger" regulations 40 do not render
a child ineligible but
merely [determine] the level of payment to the eligible family on the basis of the
presence or absence of a lodger in the recipient household. This method of computing
shelter allowance is permitted under the King v. Smith rationale if it is not designed
to vindicate a moral interest unrelated to the need of the family, and if it realistically
determines the level of need. 50
There is little basis for the court's first premise that this method of computation is permitted under King so long as the underlying purpose is not moralistic.
It is true that the Alabama regulations invalidated by King were designed to
"vindicate a moral interest." 51 However, the King Court did not hold the state
interest in deterring immorality and illegitimacy invalid in itself. Rather, it held
that the state's valid interest may not take precedence over the federal government's goal as incorporated in AFDC.52 While the invalidity of a state purpose
per se may result in condemnation of its regulation, a valid purpose will not
save the regulation if its effect is to defeat or deter the federal interest fixed by
AFDC.5
45. 365 F. Supp. at 195.
46 Id.
47. 497 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1974).
48. Id. at 1214.

49. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 352.30(d), 352.31(a)(3)(iv) (1973). See note 2 supra for text of
regulations.
50. 497 F.2d at 1214-15 (emphasis added). The court was correct in distinguishing New
York's "lodger" from Alabama's "substitute parent," in that New York's lodger regulation
merely reduces benefits, whereas Alabamas substitute parent regulation terminated them.
However this distinction is doubtful in light of the "man-in-the-house" regulation (see
note 21 supra), which the court failed to confront directly. See text accompanying note 42
supra.

51. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
52. "We ... emphasize that no legitimate interest of the State of Alabama is defeated ....
The State's interest in discouraging illicit sexual behavior and illegitimacy may be protected
by other means ... !' 392 U.S. at 333-34.
53. Id. at 316-27.
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The Taylor court's second premise, that this method of computation realistically determines-by fair inference-level of need, also is questionable. The
court concluded that New York's regulations were distinguishable from those
invalidated by Lewis and its progeny 54 because New York relied on a "fair
inference" rather than a conclusive presumption. 5 In addition, the court continued, New York's fair inference was not related to possible additional income
contributed by the AFDC lodger, but was reasonably related to the family's need
for space.
The court posited that if an AFDC recipient living with non-AFDC relatives
or friends would only be entitled to his pro rata share of the total rent regardless of his actual contribution thereto, then, likewise, the AFDC family should
only be entitled to its pro rata share of the total expenses when a non-recipient
lives with them.Y' However, the former situation was presented in Battle v.
Lavine,s and there the New York Appellate Division reached the contrary
conclusion.5 9
The crux of the Taylor court's decision is found in its reasoning that "economies of scale" justify reducing shelter payments when a lodger moves in.
[Pier-individual housing costs decrease as the number of individuals living together
increases.... Thus, the New York scheme does not attribute a false duty of support
or a false source of income, but rather accounts for the actual cost of housing to an
AFD C-recipient family.60
It is true that if the rent remains constant while the number of individuals increases the per capita cost of rent is less. However, per capita rental cost is
irrelevant unless the lodger actually pays his per capita share. Thus the "economies of scale" formula is valid only if the lodger in fact contributes-or is presumed to contribute. When the lodger does not contribute, the formula depends
upon this presumption for its relevance, but there is adequate authority which
would reject conclusive presumptions as unconstitutional.0 1
54. Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970). See also notes 23-25 supra and accompanying
text.
55. 497 F.2d at 1215. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
56. Id. at 1215.
57. Id.
58. 44 App. Div. 2d 307, 354 N.Y.S.2d 680 (2d Dep't, 1974) appeal docketed, No. -,
Ct. App. July 2, 1974.
59. Id. at 310, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 683. See notes 38-42 supra and accompanying text.
60. 497 F.2d at 1215-16 (emphasis added).
61. "When the economies of scale theory is applied to a mixed household [eligible persons
and ineligible persons], one consideration ... becomes relevant which is not relevant in considering a household composed solely of AFDC recipients. The nonrecipient is presumed to
contribute one equal share of the the household expenses." Mothers & Childrens Rights Org.
v. Stanton, 371 F. Supp. 298, 302 (N.D. Ind. 1973) (state regulation irrebuttably presuming
support violative of supremacy clause); accord, Owens v. Parham, 350 F. Supp. 598, 605
(N.D. Ga. 1972) (pro rata deduction in AABD benefits invalid as applied); Hausman v.
Department of Insts. & Agcys., 64 N.J. 202, 314 A.2d 362 (1974), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct.
3083 (1974) (automatic pro rata reduction in level of need invalidated). For a criticism
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Dissenting in Taylor, Judge Oakes reasoned that King was controlling.
The first challenged regulation . . . is New York's administrative soft shoe around

King v. Smith.... New York defines a man who lives with a woman to whom he
is not married and for whom he does not assume financial responsibility as a "lodger."
In King, Alabama had defined a man who engaged in the same conduct a "parent."...
[B]y New York's cleverness in changing a "parent" to a "lodger," it has managed,
with the aid of today's decision, to accomplish what a number of other states have
in the AFDC child's benefits on the basis of the mother's living
not-the reduction
62
arrangements.
The majority's sole basis for distinguishing Lewis was that New York's fair
inference is not a conclusive presumption.63 Judge Oakes took issue with the
majority's conclusion.
Labeling the New York regulation a "fair inference" does not change its conclusive
nature where a showing contrary to the inference will not affect the shelter allowance
reduction; here the only fact considered by the State in the fair hearing is the presence
or absence of a lodger, not the amount of space in the apartment. If the regulation
provided only for a rebuttable presumption, whether of payments by the lodger or of
excess space, there might well be a different questiona.
This led him to conclude that the inference was invalid not only because it was
conclusive, but also because it was neither factually valid nor material. The
presence of a lodger in the household, he continued, does not necessarily indicate
that the family had more space than it needed.6 Even if this inference were
factually valid, Judge Oakes concluded, this could not have been the basis for
the regulation because benefits are restored as soon as the lodger moves outY6
Judge Oakes found little justification in the argument that "economies of
scale" justify reductions in shelter payments as lodgers move in.
It is nonsense ...

to say that the cost of housing to the recipient family decreases

when there is a non-paying lodger. Moreover, an economy of scale does not reduce
the total cost of anything .... An economy of scale would operate only if the lodger

were presumed to pay his pro rata share. But such a presumption would be dearly
67
unlawful, as the majority concedes ....
The dissent focused on the problems of the family, rather than the lodger. It
pointed out that the ineligible lodger does not obtain any AFDC benefits; thus
a reduction in the AFDC grant takes nothing away from the lodger. 68 Instead,
Judge Oakes maintained, these regulations penalize the family by depriving
of irrebuttable presumptions, see Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1534 (1974).
62. 497 F.2d at 1217 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 1215; see notes 54-56 supra and accompanying text.
64. 497 F.2d at 1219 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1219 n.8.
67. Id. at 1222.
68. Id. at 1220-21.
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them of benefits to which they would otherwise be entitled.0 9 The state's remedy
against "free riding," he argued, would be to proceed against the lodger, not the
family. 70
71
Lastly, the dissent found that the AFDC goal of strengthening the family
was contravened by New York. Judge Oakes noted that these regulations make
it unprofitable for a welfare family to stay together unless they are all on public
72
assistance.
Therefore, he concluded that these regulations violate the federal statute and
federal regulations because they deny the child his needs for reasons "which are
irrelevant to the welfare of the child,"' 7 and which bear no relation to the pur74
pose of the statute.
The dissent is persuasive. The cases-until Taylor-had made it clear that it
is irrelevant to inquire whether New York's purpose is to prevent non-eligible persons from indirectly benefitting under AFDC, or to prevent eligible recipients
from receiving duplicative assistance, or to discourage cohabitation or illegitimacy. Prior courts would have inquired only whether these regulations deny
needy and dependent children benefits to which they would otherwise be entitled,
for reasons unrelated to need.
Taylor's "fair inference" is a semantic circumvention of King and Lewis.
That the Second Circuit in reality has sanctioned a conclusive presumption is
made clear by the district court opinion on remand,70 which held that the regulations are violative of due process because "[t]here can be no hearing to
decide whether in any particular case the presumptions are contrary to the
facts."70 It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will sanction what
under Lewis clearly seems violative of the supremacy clause.
Mary Ellen Kris
69. "[Wjhat the State is doing is not keeping welfare funds from the ineligible by this
regulation. Rather it seeks to punish the welfare family for using its own resources In a
manner of which the Commissioner disapproves in advance in every case. Whether the Commissioner is attempting to enforce 'middle class morality' . . . or just trying to save money
any way he can, the federal statute and regulations, and the unanimous case law forbid the
State from enforcing its predilections which are irrelevant to the welfare of the child by
depriving the eligible child of its needs." Id. at 1221 (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted).
70. Id. at 1222.
71. Rodriguez v. Vowell, 472 F.2d 622 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 944 (1973). See
notes 5, 26-27 supra.
72. 497 F.2d at 1218-19 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 1221 (emphasis omitted).
74. Id. at 1222-23.
75 Hurley v. Van Laye, Nos. 73-3423, 72-699 (S.D. & E.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 1974) (three
judge court, with judge Hays, who wrote the Second Circuit opinion in Taylor, vigorously
dissenting).
76. Id. at 7.

